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FIONA DE LONDRAS & SUZANNE KINGSTON*
Rights, Security, and Conflicting International
Obligations: Exploring Inter-Jurisdictional
Judicial Dialogues in Europe
The European Court of Justice's decision in Kadi & Al Barakaat
has frequently been condemned as a missed opportunity for the Court
to engage in a wider international debate about how states' multiple
layers of obligation relate to one another. In this paper, we compare
the ECJ's approach in this case to previous approaches in the Council
of Europe, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the EU courts
themselves. We argue that the way in which the Court chose to frame
the issues in Kadi in fact enabled it to engage in an inter-institutional
and inter-organizational international dialogue rejecting dichoto-
mous approaches to security and rights. At the same time, the
approach enabled the Court to strengthen its internal constitutional
commitment to fundamental rights protection and, a priori, to reject
dichotomous counter-terrorist approaches on the local as well as the
international level. We therefore present Kadi as a case of key signifi-
cance for both European and international constitutionalist processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In its Kadi and Al Barakaat (hereinafter Kadi) judgment,' the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) gave its clearest picture to date of
the balance struck within the European Union (EU) legal order be-
tween the competing principles of primacy of international law and
protection of fundamental rights. The conflict in this case played it-
self out within the broader patterns of contestation and counter-
contestation between perceived security needs and counter-terrorism
on the one hand and perceived human rights requirements on the
other.
* Fiona de Londras, BCL, LL.M, PhD (NU) Lecturer in Law, UCD School of
Law. Suzanne Kingston, BA, LL.M, PhD (Leiden), BL Lecturer in Law, UCD School of
Law. We acknowledge the generous support of the UCD School of Law research com-
mittee's competitive fund in preparing this Article and thank Deirdre Gallagher,
Pierre Tournier, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, and Aysel Allahverdiyeva for excellent re-
search assistance. All opinions and errors of course remain our own.
1. Kadi, appealed from Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat [2005] ECR II-
3533 and Case T-315/01 Kadi [2005] ECR 11-3649.
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The judgment concerned an appeal from a decision of the Court
of First Instance (CFI) which had rejected the applicants' actions to
annul Council Regulation 881/2002 (the "contested Regulation") inso-
far as it related to them.2 The contested Regulation was the latest in
a string of previous Regulations passed at the EU level implementing
UN Security Council (SC) Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000),
essentially requiring UN Member States to freeze without delay
funds controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any un-
dertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the
UN A1-Qaida 3 and Taliban Sanctions Committee. The contested Reg-
ulation, which was adopted on the basis of Articles 60, 301, and 308
EC Treaty, provided in Article 2:
1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned
or held by, a natural or legal person, group or entity desig-
nated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex I
shall be frozen.
2. No funds shall be made available, directly or indirectly,
to, or for the benefit of, a natural or legal person, group or
entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in
Annex I.
3. No economic resources shall be made available, directly or
indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a natural or legal person,
group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and
listed in Annex I, so as to enable that person, group or entity
to obtain funds, goods or services.
As the Sanctions Committee had, in late 2001, placed the applicants
on its consolidated list, their names appeared in Annex I of the con-
tested Regulation and their assets were frozen accordingly. Pursuant
to SC Resolution 1452 (2002) certain derogations from the obligations
to freeze funds could be permitted by Member States on humanita-
rian grounds, subject to the consent of the Sanctions Committee. This
Resolution was, in turn, implemented at the EU level by a Common
Position and Regulation. 4
The CFI dismissed the applicants' case, on grounds discussed in
Part IV. On appeal, the applicants' arguments were essentially that
2. The applicants had originally sought annulment of Regulation 2062/2001 OJ
2001 L 277/25 and Regulation 2199/2001 OJ 2001 L 295/16 insofar as these measures
concerned them; the CFI held as a preliminary matter in its judgment that the sole
object of the actions should be considered to be a claim for annulment of the contested
Regulation insofar as it concerned them.
3. In the literature this organization is referred to variously as Al Qaida, Al
Qaeda and Al Q'aida. In this Article, we use the term Al Qaida as does the Sanctions
Committee itself.
4. Common Position 2003/140/CFSP OJ 2003 L 53/62; Regulation 561/2003 OJ
2003 L 82/1.
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(1) the contested Regulation lacked a valid legal basis in the EC
Treaty, (2) the CFI had breached international law in its ruling, and
(3) the contested Regulation violated their fundamental rights. In its
judgment, the ECJ controversially focused exclusively on the EU le-
gal order and held that no measures could be introduced, including
measures implementing mandatory SC Chapter VII Resolutions, that
conflicted with the fundamental rights protected within the EU. The
ECJ's decision in this case has been described as dualist, isolationist,
and calling into question the extent to which the EU "cares" about
international law. Such analyses, we argue, fail to properly grasp the
extent to which Kadi represents an attempt by the ECJ to engage in
an international dialogue between institutions (ECJ and SC) and or-
ganizations (UN and EU) as well as the ECJ's commitment to
furthering the process of internal constitutionalization of the Euro-
pean legal order. This dual constitutionalist message becomes
evident when one contrasts the ECJ's framing of the question before
it with the manner in which analogous questions have been framed
and decided in other European courts. In that context, this Article
examines the pre-Kadi approaches of the CFI and ECJ, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the superior courts of three
European states-the United Kingdom, France, and Germany-for
the purposes of illustrating the influence that strategic framing deci-
sions can have on the outcome of legal disputes and, by implication,
on the messages of constitutional commitment to fundamental rights
communicated by such decisions.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II sets out the normative
background of Kadi in terms of the conflicting obligations at stake for
EU Member States in that case, i.e., obligations flowing from Chapter
VII SC Resolutions, on the one hand, and human rights obligations
flowing from EU, ECHR and UN law, on the other. In Part III, we
analyze a range of efforts from the bench to reconcile these conflicts
prior to Kadi, examining the approaches of the EU courts, the ECtHR
and the superior courts of three EU Member States-before going on
to consider the ECJ's reasoning in Kadi. In Part IV, we consider
Kadi's significance both internally, i.e., for the EU legal order, and
externally, i.e., for the international legal order. Part V provides a
conclusion.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF KAD!. CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS
The dispute in Kadi was a microcosm of the broader questions
faced by states as counter-terrorism becomes increasingly interna-
tionalized and led by the SC by means of its Chapter VII measures. 5
First is the decades-old question of the relationship between security
5. See generally ERICA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2004).
2010]
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and fundamental rights that states have grappled with at the domes-
tic level. In situations of terrorist threat, it is not uncommon for a
dangerous dichotomy to be constructed between the protection of the
state on the one hand (security) and the protection of individual liber-
ties on the other (rights).6 The migration of counter-terrorism from
the state to the international community, especially in the aftermath
of the attacks of September 11, 2001, has seen the replication of this
dichotomous construct particularly at the SC level. Second, states in-
creasingly find themselves operating within a matrix of different
legal regimes whose relationships to one another may not always be
entirely clear. In any given situation, a European state may easily
find itself having to negotiate a path between obligations at the inter-
national (UN), regional (EU, EC, and Council of Europe) and
domestic (constitutional and legislative) levels. At times-such as in
relation to the SC's asset freezing regime-these obligations may ap-
pear to conflict with one another and to be irreconcilable.
A. Security Obligations
1. SC Chapter VII Resolutions
Although a systematic treatment of terrorism has traditionally
been difficult for international institutions, the SC had occasionally
addressed individual incidents of terrorism through various Resolu-
tions. In addition, a dozen international conventions had been
adopted dealing with discrete elements of terrorism even before the
attacks of September 11, 2001.7 Terrorism certainly comes within the
remit of the SC given terrorists' capacity to seriously threaten inter-
national peace and security and the Council's mandate to protect
these values. Indeed, it was under this Chapter VII mandate that the
SC introduced Resolution 1267 in 1999 against the Taliban. This Res-
olution forms the cornerstone of the modern, post-9/11, counter-
terrorist asset-freezing regime that is the focus of this Article.
6. See, for example, LAURA DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTER-TERRORISM:
POWER, POLITICS AND LIBERTY (2008).
7. UN Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft (1963); UN Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(1970); UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviations (1971); UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons (1973); UN International Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980); UN Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation, supplemen-
tary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (1988); UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988); UN Protocol for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf(1988); UN Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detec-
tion (1991); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings(1997); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(1999).
[Vol. 58
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On September 12, 2001, the SC passed Resolution 1368 declaring
its intention to combat international terrorism "by all means."8 One
of the most fundamental ways of trying to disrupt terrorist activity is
by the disruption of financing. 9 The SC approached this task in two
ways. First, it introduced Resolution 1373, imposing a general obliga-
tion on all states to "prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist
acts" and establishing the UN Counter-Terrorist Committee'0 to ad-
minister and support the scheme. Second, the SC expanded the pre-
existing asset-freezing regime under Resolution 1267. It is the Euro-
pean implementation of the 1267 regime-by which decisions
regarding listing, delisting, and humanitarian exemptions are made
at the UN level-that was at issue in Kadi.
The Al Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (the "Sanctions
Committee"), established under Resolution 1267 in 1999,11 now has
an expanded remit to identify individuals and organizations whose
finances are to be frozen or disrupted as a result of terrorist activity.
The Sanctions Committee maintains a list of individuals and entities
with respect to A1-Qaida, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and other
individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them.
This list-known as the Consolidated List-is the basis for the freez-
ing of assets and disruption of finances by domestic financial services
bodies under the 1267 regime. The Consolidated List can include list-
ings not only of those said to be involved in or members of the Taliban
and Al Qaida, but also those who are said to be "associated with"
Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaida, the Taliban "or any cell, affiliate, splin-
ter group or derivative thereof.' 2 The concept of "association" is
broadly defined.' 3 In addition, any individual, entity, group or under-
taking that "otherwise support[s] acts or activities" of Al Qaida,
Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban "or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or
derivative thereof' might be put on the Consolidated List.
The first step in the listing process is the identification at the
national level of candidates for listing. Thus the initial analysis of
whether a person or entity fulfils the requirements for inclusion
takes place on the domestic politico-legal level, although given the
fact that the individual might live in a state of which he or she is not
a citizen, there will often be a transnational element to it. The pro-
posing state is required to compile the evidence gathered against the
person proposed for listing and present that evidence, together with
8. Preamble to SC Resolution 1368 (2001).
9. For a concise summary of how international terrorist organizations construct
their finances, see, e.g., Jimmy GURUL9, UNFUNDING TERROR: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO
THE FINANCING OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 21-51 (2008).
10. Id., Operative Paragrah 6.
11. SC Resolution 1267 (1999), Operative Paragraph 6.
12. Operative Paragraph 2, Resolution 1822 (2008).
13. Id.
20101 363
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an appropriately completed standard form, to the Sanctions Commit-
tee which subsequently makes a decision as to a listing based on this
information. All of the Sanctions Committee's meetings take place as
closed sessions unless the Committee itself decides to hold an open
session at any given time.14 The listing process within the Sanctions
Committee is non-adversarial and the person being proposed for list-
ing does not have any opportunity to make out a case. Thus, the
consequences of inclusion on the Consolidated List are placed on
listed persons without meaningful, rights-protecting, international
processes.
All those included on the Consolidated List can make a petition
for review. This petition will be made either directly to one's state of
residence or nationality or to the "Focal Point," i.e., a centralized
point from which the communication with the initiating state is con-
ducted. Notably, the Focal Point was introduced in 2006 and did not,
therefore, exist at the time that Kadi was included in the Consoli-
dated List. States may use their discretion to allow humanitarian
exemptions from the asset freeze that accompanies inclusion in the
Consolidated List.15 This is subject to the exempting state notifying
the Sanctions Committee of its intention to release these funds and
the Sanctions Committee not taking a negative decision on the rele-
vant state's intention within three days of receiving this notification.
The international system does not dictate how the exempting state's
decision to allow access to these funds and assets ought to be taken.
2. Implementation of Chapter VII Resolution Obligations by
the EU
Although neither the EC16 nor the EU 17 is a signatory to the UN
Charter, all twenty-seven EU Member States are members of the
UN, with France and the United Kingdom holding permanent seats
on the SC. Thus, all Member States are bound by mandatory Chapter
VII Resolutions of the SC. Member States have in many instances
14. CTC Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work (Dec. 9, 2008
version), para. 2(a).
15. Under Operative Paragraph 1(a) of Resolution 1452 (2002), assets and funds
that are "necessary for basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or
mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public
utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reim-
bursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees
or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or other finan-
cial assets or economic resources" can be made available to the listed individual or
entity.
16. Arts. 3 & 4, UN Charter provide that only states may be members of the
United Nations.
17. Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009, the
EU did not have the legal capacity to sign up to international agreements. Arts. 216-
218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly the EC Treaty)
amends this-Treaty of Lisbon OJ 2008 C 115/1.
[Vol. 58
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chosen to implement UN Resolutions, especially those creating eco-
nomic sanctions, by means of EU measures. This choice is generally
motivated by reasons of efficiency and politics, as well as the wish to
avoid unilateral measures which could compromise the EU common
market18 given that, as a legal matter, Member States are free to
implement UN Resolutions unilaterally.19 In the case of UN economic
sanctions, Member States have typically used a combination of EU
implementing measures, due to the EU's particular constitutional
set-up.
A first layer of implementation comprises measures passed
under the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP).20 The
standard CFSP measure used to implement UN economic sanctions
is the common position, the aim of which is to "define the approach of
the Union to a particular matter."21 The EU Treaty obliges Member
States to "ensure that their national policies conform to the common
positions,"22 although they do not have direct effect 23 and the Com-
munity courts currently have no jurisdiction over CFSP.24
18. This rationale is normally specified in the preamble to the implementing EC
legislation. See, in the case of the contested Regulation in Kadi, for instance, pream-
ble, recital 3.
19. However, even when implemented by means of EU measures, Member States
remain responsible for the consequences of implementing UN Resolutions. Thus, the
ECJ has held that the damage resulting from economic sanctions imposed by a UN
Resolution cannot be attributed to the EC: Case T-194/95 Dorsch Consult [1998] ECR
11-667.
20. Also known as the second pillar of EU law, under the traditional image of the
EU's constitutional structure as comprising three pillars (set up originally by the
Treaty of Maastricht OJ 1992 C 191/1, and amended by a variety of subsequent Trea-
ties), with the first pillar being the EC, the second pillar being the CFSP, and the
third pillar Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (previously termed
Justice and Home Affairs). While integration in the first pillar displays many supra-
national characteristics (e.g., more powers granted to supranational institutions, such
as the Commission and the European Parliament; widespread qualified majority vot-
ing in the Council; compulsory jurisdiction of the Community courts), integration in
the second and third pillars remains mainly intergovernmental (e.g., fewer powers for
the Commission and European Parliament; unanimity of voting in the Council; no
compulsory jurisdiction of the Community courts). On the demarcation between EC
measures and CFSP measures, see Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (Small Arms
and Light Weapons) [20081 ECR 1-3651.
21. Art. 15 EU.
22. Id.
23. By direct effect is meant the right of individuals to rely on provision of the
EEC Treaty before their national courts, even without a layer of domestic implement-
ing law (as long as the relevant Community norm was justiciable, i.e., clear and
sufficiently precise). This right was subsequently extended to binding secondary Com-
munity legislation (although, in the case of Directives, only in actions against the
State): see, for instance, Case C-152/84 Marshall [19861 ECR 723.
24. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on December 1, 2009, extends
its jurisdiction to include ensuring that the Union's general competences did not af-
fect the CFSP and vice versa, as well as review of "the legality of decisions providing
for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council" (Art.
275 TFEU). It also gets rid of the formal three pillar structure, merging them all into
a unified structure (the EU) and abolishing the EC as a separate entity. Unless other-
20101 365
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A second layer of EU implementation of UN economic sanctions
comprises European Community (EC) law measures. These are used
where the implementing measures further one of the aims of the EC,
as set out in the EC Treaty. In particular, as one of the EC's main
goals remains achieving the common market,25 EC measures are
used where it is felt that unilateral measures may cause distortions
of competition harmful to the common market. In addition, the legal
effects of EC measures are quite different from those of CFSP mea-
sures, reflecting the more supranational nature of the EC. EC
Regulations ("Regulations") are used to implement UN economic
sanctions. Regulations have the distinctive quality of being directly
applicable in the legal orders of each Member State (i.e., no transpos-
ing legislation is required), 26 and can in themselves give rights to and
impose obligations on individuals.
As the EC's powers are confined to those which have been con-
ferred on it by its Member States, each Regulation must specify the
EC Treaty provision(s) on which it is based (the "legal basis" of the
legislation). Regulations implementing UN economic sanctions freez-
ing the assets of natural and legal persons (so-called "smart
sanctions") have thus far tended to be based on a combination of Arti-
cles 60, 301, and 308 EC. Articles 60 and 301 EC, read together,
enable the Council to take urgent action, by qualified majority voting,
on the movement of capital and payments where this is deemed nec-
essary to implement a CFSP common position or joint action
requiring economic relations with one or more third countries to be
interrupted or suspended. Due to doubts (particularly on the Coun-
cil's behalf)27 as to whether individuals could properly be included
within the scope of Article 301 EC, Article 308 EC was added as a
third legal basis for "smart" sanctions. This Article, commonly known
as the "flexibility clause," allows for action by the Community, sub-
ject to a unanimous vote in the Council and consultation of the
European Parliament, where such action is "necessary to attain, in
the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objec-
tives of the Community" and where no legal basis otherwise exists in
the EC Treaty.
Although the EU is not a member of the UN, the decision to fulfil
Member States' Chapter VII obligations by means of EU measures
results in a need to ensure not only that the state-level domestic
processes are rigorous and rights-based but also that the internal
wise indicated, Treaty references in this Article are to the pre-Lisbon numbering and
Treaty structure.
25. Art. 2 EC. The goal of achieving the common market has, since the 1957
Treaty of Rome, been supplemented in subsequent Treaty revisions to include flank-
ing aims such as social and environmental protection.
26. Art. 249 EC.
27. See Jean-Paul Jacqud, Case Note on Kadi, 45 RTD EUR, janv-mars (2009), 163.
[Vol. 58
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processes of the EU adhere to the fundamental principles of individ-
ual rights. This is important not only in order to ensure compliance
with the EU's own internal human rights framework, but also to aid
Member States of the EU in complying with all of their levels of as-
set-freezing obligations (UN, EU, and domestic) and their human
rights obligations at the domestic, EU, and international levels.
3. Effect of UN Obligations within the EU Legal Order
In order to understand the effects of UN obligations within the
EU legal order, we must untangle the multiple and complex ways in
which international law and international agreements can take effect
within it.
First, where the EC signs up to an international agreement the
EC Treaty provides that it becomes binding on the EC institutions
and on Member States (i.e., pacta sunt servanda),28 forming part of
the EC legal order from the date when it enters into force.29 As the
EC is not itself a signatory to the UN Charter, UN obligations proba-
bly cannot take effect in EC law in this manner, although the ECJ in
Kadi declined to come to an absolute conclusion on this point.30
Second, where an international agreement has been concluded
not by the EC itself but by each of its Member States, the agreement
(and decisions taken by institutions set up under it)3 1 will still have
binding force within the EC legal order if the EC has taken over the
powers previously exercised by its Member States in the field covered
by the agreement. 32 In the case of the UN Charter, the EC has not
generally taken over such powers; rather, competence in the fields
covered by the Charter has either largely remained with the Member
States (e.g., security and defense) or is at most shared by the EU and
its Member States (e.g., promoting respect for fundamental rights).33
Third, an international agreement (and decisions taken by insti-
tutions set up under it) will still have binding force where the EC is
not a signatory if the EC Treaty expressly provides that the EC must
28. Art. 300(7) EC.
29. Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, para. 5, Case 104/81 Kupferberg
[19821 ECR 3641.
30. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 307 ("supposing [Article 300(7)] to be applicable to
the Charter of the United Nations").
31. See Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR 1-6079.
32. Classic examples of this are agreements concluded in the field of international
trade such as the GATT, where the EC Treaty conferred the powers covered by the
GATT agreement on the EC. As a result, the ECJ has held that the GAIT (and its
successor, the WTO agreement) have binding force as a matter of EC law (Joined
Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company [1972] ECR 1219).
33. See further, Martin Nettesheim, U.N. Sanctions against Individuals - A Chal-
lenge to the Architecture of European Union Governance 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 567
(2007).
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exercise its powers in accordance with the agreement. 34 No such ex-
press provision exists in the case of the UN Charter.35
Fourth, the ECJ has held that the EC must respect international
law generally in the exercise of its powers.36 Thus, the ECJ takes
customary international law and general principles of international
law into account in interpreting and applying EC law.37 In particular,
where the EC has given undertakings in the context of the UN and
other international organizations, its powers must be exercised in ob-
servance of these undertakings. 38 Where EC legislation is passed to
implement a SC Resolution, the wording and purpose of such Resolu-
tion must be taken into account in interpreting the implementing
legislation. 39
A similar wish to respect international law is evident from Arti-
cle 307 EC, which provides that rights and obligations arising from
international agreements concluded with third countries by one or
more Member States before the EC Treaty entered into force or
before their accession "shall not be affected by the provisions of this
Treaty."4 0 The outcome is that, should a conflict arise between a pro-
vision of EC law and an obligation flowing from such a prior
agreement, the obliged Member State must comply with the interna-
tional obligation 41 and the EC must not impede such compliance.4 2
However, this Article goes on to specify that, to the extent that such
agreements are not compatible with the EC Treaty, the Member
State(s) concerned shall "take all appropriate steps to eliminate the
incompatibilities established."4 3 Article 307 clearly applies to Mem-
ber States' obligations flowing from the UN Charter, as all Member
States joined the UN prior to becoming members of the EU. It follows
that the EC must not impede Member States from complying with
34. Although rare, examples of this include the Geneva Convention of 1951 and
the Protocol of 1967 relating to the status of refugees (Art. 63(1) EC).
35. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on December 1, 2009, includes
"respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law"
among the objectives of the EU's external action (Art. 3 TEU). Unless otherwise indi-
cated, Treaty references in this Article are to the pre-Lisbon numbering and
structure.
36. Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva [1992] ECR 1-6019. The ECJ has taken ac-
count of ICJ judgments in interpreting EC law. See, for instance, Case C-162/96
Racke [1998] ECR 1-3655.
37. Examples include the territoriality principle as a limit to the scope of the EC's
jurisdiction (see, for instance, Case T-102/96 Gencor [1999] ECR 11-753) and the law
of treaties codified in the Vienna Convention of 1969 (for instance, Case T-115/94 Opel
Austria [1997] ECR 11-39).
38. See, in the context of the EC's cooperation and development policy, Case C-91/
05 Commission v. Council (Small Arms and Light Weapons) [2008] ECR 1-3651 and
see Kadi, supra note 1, paras. 292-93.
39. Case C-117/06 Mollendorf and M6llendorf-Niehuus [2007] ECR 1-8361.
40. Art. 307(1) EC.
41. Case 158/91 Levy [19931 ECR 1-4287.
42. Case 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787.
43. Art. 307(2) EC.
[Vol. 58
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their UN obligations. 4 Nonetheless, as we discuss below, the ECJ
held in Kadi that Article 307 EC does not permit any challenge to the
principle of protection of fundamental rights within the EC legal
order.4
5
Finally, and in any event, Article 297 EC allows the Member
States, after prior consultation, jointly to act in situations where a
Member State is called upon to take measures in order "to carry out
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and
international security."
In sum, it is evident from the above that, even before Kadi, the
question of the effect of international law-and in particular UN obli-
gations-within the EU legal order was a complex one. In this regard
Kadi offers welcome clarification, quite apart from what one may
think of the substance of the judgment.
B. Human Rights Obligations
All EU Member States are constrained in their actions by a
multi-layered system of rights-protection that includes UN human
rights treaties to which they are a party, the Council of Europe's
ECHR, fundamental rights under EU law, customary international
law including jus cogens and their own domestic rights-protection
provisions including constitutional standards. In implementing the
SC's asset-freezing regime, these states operate under a general duty
to comply with their human rights obligations under international
law. This duty arises not only out of their ratification of various
human rights treaties but also, since 2003, by virtue of an express
direction of the SC itself. In Resolution 1456 (2003), the SC provided:
States must ensure that any measure taken to combat ter-
rorism comply with all their obligations under international
law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with in-
ternational law, in particular international human rights,
refugee, and humanitarian law.4 6
In relation to treaty-based obligations under the ECHR and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), states
have the option to enter a derogation to certain protected rights in
times of war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation.47
Derogations permit of the suspension of the full extent of certain
treaty provisions' operations and ought only to be entered in limited
44. Case C-177/95 Ebony Maritime [1997] ECR 1-1111. See also, Case C-84/95
Bosphorus [1996] ECR 1-3953, discussed in the text at infra note 58.
45. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 304.
46. SC 1456 (2003), Operative Paragraph 6.
47. Art. 15, European Convention on Human Rights; Art. 4, International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.
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circumstances and be as limited (temporally, geographically, and
substantively) as possible under the circumstances. 48 No European
Member States entered any derogations for the purpose of imple-
menting the sanctions regime mandated by the SC. As a result, all of
these states remain bound by their human rights obligations under
these treaties, taking into account the well-established degrees of
flexibility that international institutions tend to afford to states in
counter-terrorism and other security operations, 49 unless it can be
shown that the obligation to freeze individuals' assets flowing from
the SC somehow overrides or at least qualifies these treaty-based
obligations.
The EU itself is also bound by certain human rights standards.
By Article 6(1) EU, the EU is founded on the principles of "liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States."
Article 6(2) EU offers further clarification that the EU "shall respect
fundamental rights" as guaranteed by the ECHR "and as they result
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as
general principles of Community law." As is well known, the latter
provision codifies the consistent case law of the ECJ since the 1970s 5°
identifying respect for fundamental rights as one of the general prin-
ciples of EC law inherent in the founding Treaties, despite the fact
that no reference was made to such respect in these Treaties.5 1 In
terms of their legal status, general principles of Community law rank
at the same level as the EC and EU Treaties themselves (i.e., as pri-
mary EU law). This means that they can function as grounds of
invalidity of binding acts passed by EC institutions, including all sec-
48. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
2IREv.lIADD.11 (2001) ON THE ICCPR DEROGATIONS REGIME AND ALY MOKHTAR,
Human Rights Obligations v Derogations: Article 15 of the European Convention on
Human Rights 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 65 (2004).
49. Fiona de Londras, The Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention: An
International Perspective on US Detention of Suspected Terrorists 12 JOURNAL OF CON-
FLICT AND SECURITY LAw 223, 247-55 (2007).
50. See, for instance, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [19701 ECR
1125, Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission [19741 ECR 491, Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhal-
len [2004] ECR 1-9609, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v. Austria [2003] ECR 1-5659.
51. This case law was, at least initially and in part, the ECJ's response to the
threat from certain national courts (particularly in Germany, as discussed in the text
at note 120 infra to refuse recognition of the supremacy of EC law over national law in
the absence of adequate guarantees that respect for fundamental rights was central
to the Community legal order. See, for instance, (Germany) Internationale Handel-
sgesellschaft [19741 2 CMLR 540 ("Solange I"), Re Wuinsche Handelsgesellschaft
[1987] 3 CMLR 225 ("Solange II"), Brunner v. The European Union Treaty [19941 1
CMLR 57 ("Maastricht"); (Italy) Frontini v Ministero dell Finanze [19741 2 CMLR
372; (Poland) judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in Polish Membership of
the European Union (Accession Treaty) K 18/04, May 11, 2005.
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ondary EC legislation, and that courts applying EC law must
interpret it as far as possible in conformity with such principles.
5 2
Notwithstanding the general obligation to comply with interna-
tional human rights law outlined in SC Resolution 1426, it is beyond
dispute that the asset-freezing regime mandated by the SC poses at
least prima facie challenges to states' capacities to vindicate individ-
ual rights. These sanctions have implications for both civil and
political rights and socio-economic rights. In relation to the latter, the
implications for individuals whose assets are frozen are immediately
evident: the inability to deal with one's assets can seriously impair
one's capacity to fully exercise the right to adequate shelter and hous-
ing,53 the right of access to adequate health care 54 and education,
55
and the right of freedom from hunger.5 6 In relation to civil and politi-
cal rights the system whereby one is listed for targeting under the
sanctions regime has the capacity to seriously undermine one's right
to fair procedures and due process of law.5 7 Listed individuals have
been compelled to go to the courts in an attempt to have their rights
vindicated and, in the course of so doing, have raised the question of
how (or, indeed, whether) apparently conflicting international obliga-
tions towards security and rights can be reconciled through judicial
interpretation and adjudication.
III. EFFORTS FROM THE BENCH TO RECONCILE THESE CONFLICTS
This Part provides an overview of the efforts from the bench to
reconcile the apparent conflicts that can arise between states' obliga-
tions under SC Resolutions on the one hand and under human rights
law on the other. The first section deals with pre-Kadi jurisprudence
in both the regional European courts and the domestic courts of the
United Kingdom, Germany, and France. The second section gives an
account of the ECJ's decision in Kadi itself. This Part illustrates the
different conclusions reached by the respective courts to broadly iden-
tical questions of norm conflict. It provides the substantive case
studies for the argument, outlined in Part IV, as to the importance of
52. See, for instance, Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491, Case C-36/02
Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR 1-9609, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v. Austria [2003]
ECR 1-5659.
53. Art.11(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
Art. 16, European Social Charter.
54. Art. 25(1), Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. 12(1), International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
55. Art. 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. 13(1), International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
56. Art. 11(2), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
For an overview of socio-economic rights see, for example, MALCOLM LANGFORD &
AoIFE NOLAN, LITIGATING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CuLTuRAL RIGHTS: LEGAL PRACTI-
TIONERS DOSSIER (2006).
57. Art. 6, European Convention on Human Rights; Art. 14, International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.
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the courts' framing decisions regarding the states' conflicting obliga-
tions in shaping and communicating the outcome of the dispute.
A. EU Courts pre-Kadi
Cases in which the EU courts have been faced with direct poten-
tial conflicts between EU human rights norms and EU measures
implementing Chapter VII Resolutions are still relatively rare. The
first real instance was in Bosphorus,58 which concerned the economic
embargo imposed by the UN SC on the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via in the early 1990s. 59 The SC Resolutions were implemented by
means of Regulation 990/93.60 Bosphorus, a Turkish airline, had
leased two aircraft for four years from the Yugoslav national airline,
JAT. Following maintenance work at Dublin airport on one of the air-
craft, the Irish government directed that it should be impounded
pursuant to Regulation 990/93 on the ground that a controlling inter-
est in the aircraft was held by a person or undertaking in or
operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Irish Su-
preme Court asked the ECJ whether this Regulation should be
interpreted as applying to an aircraft in circumstances where the air-
craft had been leased to a non-Yugoslav undertaking.
Following Advocate General Jacobs, the ECJ held that the Regu-
lation did so apply, referring expressly to the SC Resolution by which
the decisive factor was the aircraft's ownership rather than its day-
to-day control. 61 Importantly, although the ECJ rejected Bosphorus's
arguments that the impounding breached its fundamental rights, it
did not decline jurisdiction to consider such arguments. Rather, it ex-
pressly engaged in an analysis of the proportionality of the
restriction, concluding that the impounding was justified in view of
the "objective of general interest so fundamental for the international
community, which consists in putting an end to the state of war in
the region and to the massive violations of human rights and human-
itarian international law in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."62
Bosphorus subsequently brought an unsuccessful action against Ire-
58. Case C-84/95 Bosphorus [1996] ECR 1-3953. See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Case
Note on Bosphorus 43 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 243 (2006) (focusing on the subsequent
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights arising out of the same facts).
59. Resolution 820 (1993), strengthening the embargo decided upon in Resolu-
tions 713 (1991), 757 (1992) and 78 (1992).
60. OJ 1993 L 102/14.
61. Bosphorus, paras. 14-17. The ECJ frequently refers to the aim of underlying
UN SC Resolutions in cases of interpreting implementing Community legislation, in-
cluding in non-human rights related cases. See, for instance, Case C-177/95 Ebony
Maritime [1997] ECR 1-1111, para 20; Case C-371/03 Aulinger [20061 ECR 1-2207;
Case C-117/06 Mollendorf [2007] ECR 1-8361.
62. Bosphorus, para. 26.
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land before the ECtHR arising out of the same facts, discussed
below. 63
Bosphorus can be distinguished from the (more numerous) in-
stances in which the Community courts have dealt with potential
conflicts between EU human rights norms and EU measures which,
although broadly flowing from Chapter VII Resolutions, do not di-
rectly reproduce them (often termed "autonomous" EU measures). As
the actual content of the EU measure has been decided upon at the
EU, rather than UN, level, such cases do not imply a direct challenge
to the legality of the Chapter VII Resolution making rights-based as-
sessments of these measures less controversial from a general
international law perspective. Thus, a more intensive standard of re-
view has been adopted by the EU courts in such cases. This occurred
for the first time with the CFI's 2006 judgment in PMOI, in which the
court annulled a Council Decision freezing the financial assets of the
People's Mujahidin of Iran (PMOI) on the ground that it infringed the
applicant's procedural rights.64 Although the Decision implemented
SC Resolution 1373, the black list on which the applicant had ap-
peared had been drawn up by the EU rather than at the UN level.
Similarly, in Sison, the CFI held that a black-listing decision which
involved the "exercise of the Community's own powers, entailing a
discretionary assessment by the Community" had to be compliant
with Community fundamental rights standards. 65
Prior to Kadi, such a "rights-based" approach appeared to reach
its limits where the EU courts were asked to review CFSP measures
for compliance with fundamental rights norms. In a line of cases be-
ginning with Segi, it has been confirmed that, under the EU Treaty
as it now stands, no jurisdiction exists to consider the compatibility of
63. (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 1.
64. Case T-228/02 PMOI [2006] ECR 11-4665, discussed in the text at note 223
infra. See also the follow-up cases Case T-256/07 PMOI ECR [2009] 11-0000 and Case
T-284/08 PMOI [2008] ECR II-0000.
65. Case T-47/03 Sison [20071 ECR 11-73, para. 154. In that case, observance of
the right of defense required that, "evidence adduced against the party concerned...
should be notified to it, in so far as possible, either concomitantly with or as soon as
possible after the adoption of an initial decision to freeze funds" (para. 184). Although
such a right had not been observed in that case, the conditions for award of damages
against the Community were not made out. In Ocalan, the ECJ took an analogous
approach, holding a challenge to an EC decision including the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK) on the EU's asset-freezing list to be admissible by interpreting its admis-
sibility criteria in the light of the general principle of respect for fundamental rights.
Case C-229/05 P Ocalan [2007] ECR 1-439, paras. 109-10, overturning the CFI's Order
in T-229/02 PKK and KNK v. Council [2005] ECR 11-539. See also, for instance, Case
C-117/06 Mollendorf [2007] ECR 1-8361, para. 78 (Member States bound, when imple-
menting Community law transposing UN SC Resolutions, to do so as far as possible in
conformity with the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights
within the Community legal order).
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such measures with EU human rights norms.66 Rather, the scope of
judicial review extends only to the question whether the use of the
CFSP measure respects the delimitation of competences between the
EC and CFSP (i.e., whether an EC measure could and should have
been used in place of a CFSP measure).67 In Segi, for instance, the
Grand Chamber of the ECJ was confronted with the question
whether it could order compensation for damage caused by Segi's in-
clusion on a list of persons, groups, and entities involved in terrorist
acts annexed to a common position implementing a Chapter VII Res-
olution, which had been adopted under the CFSP and the other area
of intergovernmental EU cooperation, justice and home affairs
(JHA).68 In answering in the negative, the ECJ emphasized the lim-
ited nature of its jurisdiction to review CFSP and JHA measures
under the current version of the EU Treaty.69 Nonetheless, it broad-
ened the scope of access to justice for JHA measures in holding that,
where JHA common positions were intended to produce legal effects
in relation to third parties, the right to effective judicial protection
required that the ECJ have jurisdiction to review their legality and to
accept preliminary references from national courts concerning such
acts despite the fact that the EU Treaty does not expressly allow for
this. 70
66. Case C-355/04 P Segi [20071 ECR 1-1657, appealed from Case T-338/02 Segi
[2004] ECR 11-1647; Case T-228/02 PMOI; Case T-299/04 Selmani; Case C-354/04 P
Gestoras Pro Amnistia [2007] ECR 1-1579, appealed from Case T-333/02.
67. See Art. 47 EU. Such Community vs EU legal basis disputes are increasingly
common, due in particular to the continued differences in power enjoyed by the Com-
mission, European Parliament, Council, and Member States in the Community pillar
as compared to the EU pillars (see, for instance, Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council
(Small Arms and Light Weapons) [2008] ECR 1-3651).
68. The common position at issue (2001/931) was adopted on the dual legal bases
of Arts. 15 and 34 EU. The provision challenged was that ordering Member States to
afford each other the "widest possible assistance" in preventing and combating terror-
ist acts, including with respect of enquiries and proceedings conducted by their
authorities in relation to those mentioned on the list.
69. Although, as noted in supra note 24, the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into
force on December 1, 2009, has extended the EU courts' jurisdiction to reviewing the
legality of CFSP sanctions against natural and legal persons (Art. 275 TFEU). See
likewise, Case T-47/03 Sison [2007] ECR 1I-73. The presence of political declarations
of the Council to the effect that the common position challenged respects individuals'
fundamental rights and that "in the event of any error in respect of the persons,
groups or entities referred to, the injured party shall have the right to seek judicial
redress" does not, in the ECJ's view, change the limited scope of its jurisdiction to
award damages for injury caused by common positions: see, for instance, Case C-354/
04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistia [2007] ECR 1-1579, paras. 58-62.
70. Segi, supra note 66, paras. 52-57. This is a classic example of the ECJ's prac-
tice of looking at the substance, rather than the form, of a measure in evaluating the
extent of its jurisdiction: as, by the EU Treaty itself, common positions are not sup-
posed to produce legal effects in relation to third parties, those which do so cannot, in
the ECJ's view, amount to "true" common positions as such.
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B. The European Court of Human Rights
Although it has not yet considered the relationship between
methods of implementing the post-September 11th asset-freezing re-
gime mandated by the SC and the requirements of the ECHR, the
ECtHR has on two occasions handed down judgments on the relation-
ship between SC Resolutions and the ECHR which are worthy of
consideration.
The case of Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland7l was decided by the
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR following a lengthy series of litigation
in Ireland and before the EU courts described above. The complain-
ant in this case claimed that the Irish government's action in
impounding the aircraft pursuant to EC Regulation 990/93 was a vio-
lation of the lessee's right to property and possessions provided for by
Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention. At the heart of
this case was the claim that the violation flowed from Ireland's coop-
eration within an international organization (the EU) which did not
provide sufficient means for the protection of human rights. The
Grand Chamber rejected the claim and held that there is a presump-
tion of compliance with a state's Convention obligations when it
cooperates with an international organization, provided that "the rel-
evant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as
regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms
controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at
least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides."72 In this
case, the ECtHR held that the EU did provide protection equivalent
to that of the Convention system, not only because of its recognition
of individual rights but also because of these rights' effectiveness. In
the ECtHR's view, mere provision for rights was not sufficient; rather
the presumption of Convention-compliance could be rebutted if the
mechanisms in place to ensure observance of those rights were
deemed ineffective. 73
Although Bosphorus was a case about equivalent protection
within the EU, the test laid down seems generalizable beyond the EU
and thus applicable to other international organizations in which
Member States participate. On an initial viewing it appears unlikely
that the asset freezing mechanisms at the UN level provide an equiv-
alence of protection under this test; while the UN is committed to the
protection, promotion, and realization of human rights (as reflected
in the Charter), the mechanisms in place for the protection of rights
in the context of asset freezing are likely to be deemed ineffective.
There are particularly grave concerns surrounding due process and a
71. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, Applica-
tion No. 45036/98, Judgment of 30 June 2005.
72. Application No. 45036/98, Judgment of 30 June 2005, para. 155.
73. Id., para. 160.
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listed person's capacity to make an effective case for delisting at the
international level. However, the role of Article 103 of the Charter of
the United Nations must not be neglected when considering the po-
tential impact of Bosphorus on any case concerning UN-level asset
freezing measures. Article 103 provides:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Mem-
bers of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
Arguably, Article 103 could be read as identifying SC Resolutions
as a special case of some kind so that even if the presumption of Con-
vention compliance were rebutted by the lack of effective rights-
protection mechanisms, the source of the international obligation
might make noncompliance with the Convention permissible. These
questions remained unanswered in Bosphorus but arose once more in
the recent joined decisions of Behrami v. France and Saramati v.
France, Germany & Norway.7 4 In these cases the court was asked to
consider whether state parties to the ECHR could be held liable
under that Convention for actions done as part of the UNFOR and
UMIK forces in Kosovo. In its admissibility decision, the Grand
Chamber found that the acts of Member States operating as part of
these multi-national forces were in fact attributable to the UN and
not to the individual States themselves. As a result, the court held
that there was no state-based responsibility for these actions and no
assessment of Convention-compliance could be undertaken-the
court lacked jurisdiction ratione personae. While this part of the deci-
sion has been subject to concerted criticism by commentators, 75 it
seems likely that the court framed the dispute in jurisdictional/attri-
bution terms in order to ensure that it would not have to consider the
impact of Article 103 of the UN Charter on states' Convention-based
obligations. 76 Thus, although the respondent parties in these cases
made express arguments that, as a result of Article 103, Chapter VII
SC Resolutions would displace or pre-empt European Convention ob-
ligations, the ECtHR did not proffer any conclusions on that matter.
That notwithstanding, the court did include within its judgment a
paragraph that suggests (albeit obiter) that attribution of action to
the UN under Chapter VII SC Resolutions precludes any Convention-
based review:
74. Application Numbers 71412/01 and 78166/01, Grand Chamber Decision on
Admissibility, 2 May 2007.
75. See esp. Marko Milanovic & Tatjana Papic, As Bad as it Gets: The European
Court of Human Rights's Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International
Law 58(2) INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 267 (2009).
76. Id., 274.
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Since operations established by UNSC Resolutions under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter are fundamental to the mis-
sion of the UN to secure international peace and security
and since they rely for their effectiveness on support from
member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a
manner which would subject the acts and omissions of Con-
tracting Parties which are covered by UNSC Resolutions and
occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to the scrutiny
of the Court.77 (emphasis added)
At first blush, Behrami appears to clash to some degree with the
ECtHR's decision in Bosphorus. It is at least arguable, however, that
these cases have different spheres of operation. Bosphorus quite
clearly laid down the principle that the presumption of equivalent
protection will apply only in cases where the state "does no more than
implement legal obligations" assumed under another treaty and
therefore does not have discretion 78 and the treaty and obligations
emanate from an organization that provides equivalent protection for
human rights as a general matter.79 This presumption-that there is
no conflict between the state's various obligations-can only be rebut-
ted under the Bosphorus principle if there is a manifest deficiency in
human rights protection in the circumstances of the particular case
at hand.80 Indeed, Bosphorus does not offer any guidance as to how a
conflict that would arise in the event of rebuttal of the presumption
would be resolved. This is primarily because of the lack in that case of
any Article 103 argumentation, which in turn resulted from the fram-
ing of Bosphorus as a conflict between the EU and the ECHR and not
as a conflict between the ECHR and SC Resolutions. Because of the
court's avoidance of Article 103 in Behrami these matters remain
largely unresolved in ECHR jurisprudence.
C. The United Kingdom
The House of Lords considered how it might reconcile seemingly
incompatible obligations of the United Kingdom under SC Resolu-
tions on the one hand and international human rights treaties as
incorporated into domestic law on the other in the recent case of R
(Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence.8 ' The case concerned the
extent to which the prolonged detention of the applicant in Iraq
under SC Resolution 1546 was incompatible with the right to be free
from arbitrary detention under Article 5 ECHR as incorporated into
domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. Although not charged
77. Supra note 71, para. 149.
78. Id., para. 156.
79. Id., paras. 154-55.
80. Id., para. 156.
81. [20081 1 AC 332.
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with any offence, A1-Jedda, a dual UK and Iraqi citizen, had been
held in security detention by UK forces in Iraq since 2004. Having
determined that Al-Jedda's detention was attributable to the United
Kingdom as opposed to the UN (thereby establishing the court's juris-
diction ratione personae),8 2 the House of Lords proceeded to consider
the extent to which Chapter VII Resolutions could override or qualify
fundamental rights guaranteed under the ECHR. In the leading
speech, Lord Bingham accepted that the United Kingdom was obliged
to detain A1-Jedda and that this gave rise to a dispute between this
obligation and those arising under Article 5 ECHR. He held that this
could be resolved by reference to Article 103 of the UN Charter. He
rejected any suggestion that human rights treaties have a different
relationship to Article 103 than do other (i.e., non-human rights)
treaties or international agreements or that non-Charter human
rights obligations were not subject to the supremacy of the Charter-
based obligations.8 3 In Lord Bingham's view, there was no basis for
drawing such a conclusion save where a human right could be said to
have the status ofjus cogens, which, according to the House, was not
true for the right to be free from arbitrary detention.8 4 Lord Bingham
did acknowledge that the difficulty inherent in holding that the UN
could mandate actions that violate individual rights given the inclu-
sion of the promotion and enforcement of human rights as a mission
of the UN in the Charter.85 Still, he accepted that there could be situ-
ations of competing obligations arising from SC Resolutions. In his
view, states must fulfil their SC obligations but ought to do so in a
manner that minimizes interference with individual rights to the ex-
tent possible. At paragraph 39, he held:
There is a clash between on the one hand a power or duty to
detain exercised on the express authority of the SC and, on
the other, a fundamental human right which the United
Kingdom has undertaken to secure to those ... within its
jurisdiction. How are these to be reconciled? There is in my
opinion only one way in which they can be reconciled: by rul-
ing that the United Kingdom may lawfully, where it is
necessary for imperative reasons of security, exercise the
power to detain authorised by United Nations SC Resolution
1546 and successive resolutions, but must ensure that the
82. Jurisdiction ratione loci for actions of UK troops operating abroad had been
established in the earlier House of Lords case of R (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for
Defence [2008] 1 AC 153. According to the Law Lords in that case UK troops were
bound by the Human Rights Act in relation to individuals within their custody even if
physically located outside of the territory of the United Kingdom itself.
83. Id., para. 35.
84. For a critique of this position and of the Law Lords' failure to give this partic-
ular consideration, see Alexander Orakhelashvilli, R (On the Application of A1-Jedda)
(FC) v Secretary of State for Defence 102 AM. J. INr'L L. 337 (2008).
85. [2008] 1 AC 332, para. 39.
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detainees' rights under Article 5 are not infringed to any
greater extent than is inherent in such detention.
Al-Jedda lays down an important principle of minimal interference
with fundamental rights in the implementation of SC Resolutions
and the UK courts' willingness to take rights-based claims into ac-
count in relation to actions mandated by the SC. The same
willingness was once more evident in the Court of Appeal's recent
decision in A & Others v. Her Majesty's Treasury,8 6 in which domestic
measures implementing the asset-freezing regimes were challenged.
These measures were the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations
Measures) Order 2006 (the "Al-Qaida Order," implementing the 1267
regime) and the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006
(the "Terrorism Order," implementing the 1373 regime). The five ap-
plicants in this case had all been designated by the Treasury under
the Terrorism Order and one of the applicants-known in the litiga-
tion as "G"-had also been designated under the A1-Qaida Order
given his inclusion in the Consolidated List. The applicants chal-
lenged their designation on the basis of an alleged violation of rights
(particularly due process rights) in the course of the designation pro-
cess. Clarke MR accepted that one's designation under either of these
Orders had the capacity to create a considerable burden for desig-
nated individuals and for their families and was particularly
concerned with a designated individual's capacity to mount an effec-
tive challenge.
The Terrorism Order provided in Article 5(4) that "The High
Court . .. may set aside a direction on the application of-(a) the
person identified in the direction, or (b) any other person affected by
the direction." The judge at first instance had found this an inade-
quate safeguard for individuals' rights as there was no express
provision for the inclusion of intercept evidence or for the appoint-
ment of a Special Advocate8 7 to argue the case on behalf of the
applicant in cases where evidence was deemed too sensitive for dis-
closure. Yet, the Court of Appeal held that even in the absence of an
express provision "there is no reason in principle why a special advo-
cate should not be appointed in a particular case." 8 The fact that the
court has a residual power to appoint a Special Advocate is, the court
held, an important protection for designated individuals. Indeed,
where no Special Advocate could be appointed, Clarke MR was appar-
86. [20091 3 WLR 25.
87. Special Advocates are lawyers appointed by the State to act on behalf of indi-
viduals where the information upon which the state's case is based is particularly
security-sensitive. While the Special Advocates originally began working in the con-
text of immigration law, they are now widely used in terrorism-relation cases. See the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK).
88. [20091 3 WLR 25, p.48, para. 58, relying on R (Roberts) v. Parole Board [20051
2 AC 738.
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ently of the view that this ought to result in the discharge of the
order.89 The court also considered the fact that there was an alterna-
tive-more rights protective-mechanism available to the state
(namely, the procedure outlined in s.s. 17 and 18 of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000) not to be fatal to the Treasury's
case.
90
In considering the same claim in relation to the A1-Qaida Order,
the Court of Appeal referred to the House of Lords decision in R (Al-
Jedda) considered above. It held that the impact of that decision in
the context of the implementation of asset freezing obligations flow-
ing from SC Resolutions is that "the court has power to consider an
application for judicial review by a person to whom the [Order] ap-
plies as a result of designation by the [Sanctions] Committee."91
Where such an application is made, the Court may, to the extent pos-
sible, consider what the basis of this listing was. Unfortunately,
however, the court was somewhat vague on how such a challenge
would operate. In particular, it did not specify how the challenge
could proceed where the individual's listing was done at the UN level
without the active participation of the United Kingdom, meaning
that the domestic authorities might not in fact be fully appraised of
the case against the individual. That, however, was not the case in
relation to the single applicant here who was affected by the Al-Qaida
Order.92
Two important points can be made about the interaction between
R (A-Jedda) and A & Ors. The first is that in considering whether
the freezing process imposed by the Terrorism Order was consistent
with the requirements of the ECHR, Clarke MR did not consider the
failure to implement the general obligation in the least-rights-violat-
ing manner available to be a cause for invalidity. This is
notwithstanding the House of Lord's decision in Al-Jedda that the
appropriate means of reconciling apparently conflicting obligations is
to ensure that obligations under SC Resolutions are implemented
with the least possible degree of rights violation. 93 Secondly, the
court's treatment of how challenges can be made to designations
under the Al-Qaida Order-where the listing has been made at the
UN level-reveals the extent to which process deficiencies at the in-
ternational level may be essentially irresolvable at the domestic
level. Whether or not the domestic designation would be quashed as a
result of this process deficit is not entirely clear, but it appears that
89. Id., 48, para. 60.
90. Id., 49, para. 65.
91. Id., 64, para. 119.
92. Id., 64 para. 120.
93. Leave for appeal was granted by the House of Lords on March 3, 2009 and the
relationship between A1-Jedda and A & Ors is likely to be one of the matters consid-
ered by the Law Lords when the case reaches the House.
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when read with Al-Jedda, they would not. The interference with
rights at this level has its source in the listing process within the UN
and the nation state is obliged to implement those listing decisions.
In such cases, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to minimize rights
violations by means of domestic judicial processes. This further rein-
forces the importance of ensuring that the processes at, and feeding
into, the UN system are as protective of individual rights as possible.
D. France
The French courts have recently considered a number of cases
concerning potential conflicts between Chapter VII Resolutions and
French human rights norms. Although Article 55 of the 1958 French
Constitution provides that duly ratified international treaties and
agreements "shall prevail over Acts of Parliament subject, for each
agreement or treaty, to reciprocal application by the other party," the
Conseil d'Etat (Council of State)9 4 has, in an analogous manner to the
approach of the German Constitutional Court discussed below, held
that the principle of primacy reaches its limits in a situation where
EU law fails effectively to protect fundamental principles of the
French constitution.9 5 However, there has been some controversy as
to whether SC Resolutions can, in principle, have direct effect (in the
sense of conferring rights and obligations on individuals) in the
French legal order,9 6 with many leading commentators holding the
view that they cannot.97 This view was confirmed by the Cour de cas-
sation (Court of Cassation) in a 2006 case concerning the question
whether the Iraqi state had, by virtue of a Chapter VII Resolution
which had not been transposed into French law, lost its immunity
from prosecution.98 In general, therefore-unless legislation has been
passed at EU level to implement a Resolution-enabling legislation
94. As with many civil law jurisdictions, the French court system is not the typi-
cal pyramid structure of common law jurisdictions. Rather, it is structured in three
separate "branches": the ordinary courts, headed by the Cour de Cassation; the ad-
ministrative courts, headed by the Conseil d'Etat, and; the Conseil constitutionnel
(Constitutional Council).
95. See, for instance, Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 3, 2001, Syndicat National de
l'Industrie de Pharmaceutique; Conseil d'Etat, Arcelor, Feb. 8, 2007, ADJA, 2007,
577.
96. See, for instance, Marie-Pierre Lanfranchi, La valeurjuridique en France des
resolutions du Conseil de sdcuritg ANNuAIRE FRANrAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 31
(1997).
97. See, for instance, the arbitral tribunal in Libyan Airlines c/Air France, sen-
tence partielle nr. 2 of March 11, 2000, nr. 64 (tribunal "ne doute pas que les
resolutions du Conseil de s6curitd ne sont pas d'application directe."). See contra,
Jean-Frangois Lachaume, Jurisprudence franqaise relative au droit international AN-
NUAIRE FRANAiSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 895 (1991) and M. Sastre RGDI publ. hr.
2/1998, 495.
98. Cass. civ. 1, Apr. 25, 2006, Etat Irakien c/Dumez.
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must be relied upon as the basis for transposing such Resolutions
into French law.99
France has traditionally adopted a rather narrow role for judges'
review of governmental activity, and especially of the legislative func-
tion, stemming from the historical distrust of the gouvernement des
juges and the ensuing centrality of a strict separation of powers doc-
trine to the French legal system. 100 Thus, review of international
obligations for compatibility with the French constitution-including
its human rights norms-can only be carried out by the Conseil con-
stitutionnel (Constitutional Council), and only where an
implementing domestic law is required and has not yet entered into
force.' 01 Further, the Conseil d'Etat has consistently held that it has
no power to review the legality of Chapter VII Resolutions, nor of
French domestic laws implementing such Resolutions, as actes de
gouvernement benefiting from immunity from judicial review. 10 2 An
example is Socigtg H6li- Union, in which a French decree implement-
ing a Chapter VII Resolution imposing restrictions on trade with
Libya was held not to be severable (ddtachable) from the conduct of
French international relations and thus escaped from all judicial re-
view where the decree essentially transcribed the Resolution's
requirements. '0 3 The key question is therefore whether the domestic
act challenged is severable from the relevant Chapter VII Resolution.
In assessing severability, the issue will be whether the domestic act
is limited to drawing the automatic consequences from an interna-
tional obligation, or conversely whether the state is left a margin of
maneuver in implementing such obligation. 10 4
The leading case dealing with the relationship between obliga-
tions flowing from Chapter VII Resolutions and human rights is,
however, the 2004 decision of the Conseil d'Etat in Association Se-
cours Mondial de France. In this case, the applicant, an ostensibly
charitable organization, sought to annul a French decree of 2002,
99. See generally Genevieve Burdeau & Brigitte Stern, France. in NATIONAL IM-
PLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004) [hereinafter NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION].
100. See generally JOHN MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADI-
TION (2007) and ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000).
101. See Arts. 53, 54 & 61 of the 1958 Constitution and C. Maugui, "Le Conseil
constitutionnel et le droit supranational," Pouvoirs 2003-2 (nr 105), 53.
102. See Franc & Boyon AJDA 1975, 456 ("Si le juge administrative sinterdit
d'apprdcier la ldgalitg de certaines decisions, c'est seulement en raison des limites qui
resultant de l'application des r~gles classiques de competence ... juges des actes de
droit interne, il ne peut connaitre de ceux qui se rattachent aux relations de la France
avec d'autres Etats ou avec des organisations internationales.").
103. See, for instance, Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 29, 2007, Soci~t6 Hdli-Union, RFDA
1998, 208 and see also Conseil d'Etat, Mar. 12, 1999, Soci6td H4li-Union, req. nr.
162.131.
104. See, for instance, A. Bacquet, Note on Conseil d'Etat, Sect., July 13, 1979,
Coparex, AJDA 1980, 371.
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which included it in a list of persons who could only engage in finan-
cial transactions with third countries following the approval of the
French ministry of the economy and finances. 10 5 The application was
based on the lack of reasoning for the listing decision, the failure to
allow the Association to make observations on the decision and the
lack of substantive grounds for the decision. In contrast to SocigtM
H6li-Union, the Conseil d'Etat held that it did have jurisdiction to
review this decree as it could be considered to be severable from the
conduct of French international relations. This was so because the
decree went beyond what was required by the Resolution, as evi-
denced by the lapse of time between the Resolution and publication of
the decree (eight months). This represents a narrowing of the concept
of actes de gouvernement in the context of implementing Chapter VII
Resolutions and a concomitant broadening of the scope for judicial
review of domestic measures implementing such Resolutions, where
no exact transposition has taken place.10 6 In particular, the mere fact
that a domestic measure can be said to follow from a Chapter VII
Resolution, in a general sense, is now clearly insufficient to isolate
such measure from judicial review. Rather, a case-by-case analysis
will be undertaken to determine the extent to which the national law
is an autonomous state measure.
However, the Conseil d'Etat went on to reject the applicant's ar-
gument that the decree should be annulled because the applicant's
right to be heard had not been respected. In reaching this conclusion,
the Conseil d'Etat reasoned that, although a general right existed in
law for parties potentially affected by administrative decisions to pre-
sent written and, potentially, oral observations before such decision
were taken,10 7 this right did not extend to situations where the rea-
sons for the decision comprised national defense secrets.' 0 8 It
appeared from the file and from the "information available to the
French authorities" 0 9 that this was so in the case at hand. Impor-
tantly, even though the Conseil d'Etat did not itself have sight of the
information on which the decision to list was based, it nonetheless
believed that it had sufficient information to decide that such deci-
105. The decree was made pursuant to Art.L 151-2 of the Code mongtaire et
financier.
106. See, for instance, L. Burorgue-Larsen, AJDA, April 4, 2005, 723 and G. Clam-
our, RECUEIL DALLOZ, 2005, nr 12, 825.
107. As provided for in the Law of April 12, 2000, Art. 24 and the Law of July 11,
1979, Arts. 1 & 2.
108. Applying Art. 413-10 of the Code Pdnal.
109. See Guylain Clamour, RECUEIL DALLOZ, 2005, nr 12, 827, who comments that
such information generally takes the form of anonymized documents (les blancs) pro-
duced by the services des renseignements gdndraux (a branch of the French national
police) without reference, signature or indication of the source of the information
provided.
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sion was not an "error of appreciation." 110 In coming to this
conclusion, the Conseil d'Etat did not use the possibility (available to
it under French law) to inquire further into the nature of the infor-
mation at issue, including the possibility of referring the matter to
the Consultative Commission on Defence Secrets set up in 1998 to
give advice on the declassification and release of national security in-
formation in court cases.11 ' A further point of note in the Conseil
d'Etat's decision is its holding that the French decision to list the ap-
plicant was "corroborated" by the decisions of the SC 11 2 and the
European Commission 13 to place the applicant on their respective
asset-freezing lists, which decisions were taken some days after the
French decree. This type of reasoning is potentially dangerous for ob-
vious reasons: the UN and/or European Commission may equally
point to the (preceding) decision of the French authorities as corrobo-
ration for their own decisions. In such a situation, the listed person or
entity may be faced with an eternal circle of finger-pointing between
the different listing authorities, with each corroborating the other,
but with no obvious way of identifying or accessing the information
which led to the initial listing.114
Finally, it should be noted that, although review of the validity of
an international norm for conformity with the French constitution
can only be carried out by the Conseil constitutionnel, the Conseil
d'Etat,"15 and the Cour de cassation'16 have nonetheless held that
international norms should, where possible, be interpreted in con-
formity with constitutional principles. Therefore, this approach
would open the possibility of these courts interpreting Chapter VII
Resolutions (and their implementation requirements) in conformity
with French constitutional human rights norms.
110. The Conseil d'Etat further noted that the applicant had "confined itself to ar-
guing that it was an independent humanitarian organisation" whose statutory objects
had raised no objection at registration, which argument was not sufficient to call the
decision into question.
111. Law nr 98/567 of July 8, 1998 instituting a Consultative Commission on Na-
tional Defence Secrets (Commission consultative du secret de la ddfense nationale).
Nor did the Conseil make use of its general powers to direct that all measures should
be taken which are necessary to obtain sufficient information to allow it to come to a
decision (see Conseil d'Etat, Sect, June 26, 1959, Synd algdrien de l'ducation surveil-
lde CFTC, Lebon, 399). See further, Guylain Clamour, RECUEIL DALLOZ, 2005, nr 12,
827, who argues that the Conseil d'Etat's standard of review was more intense than
one might have expected, because it did not use the language of "manifest" error of
appreciation. However, one might note that the outcome would have been no different
from the applicant's perspective had such language been used.
112. Resolution 1267/2002.
113. Regulation 1893/2002.
114. See contra, Laurence Burorgue-Larsen, AJDA, April 4, 2005, 725, who
welcomes the decision as an example of reliance on international and EC action by the
Conseil d'Etat in support of its conclusion.
115. Conseil d'Etat, Kon6, July 3, 1996, RFDA, 1996, 982; Conseil d'Etat, Sarran,
Oct. 30, 1998.
116. Cour de Cassation, Pauline Fraisse, June 2, 2000, RGDIP, 2000, 815.
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E. Germany
In Germany, most treaties are concluded at the federal level, be-
coming part of domestic federal law with the adoption of a domestic
law of ratification. Although Article 24(1) of the German Constitution
states that "the Federation may by legislation transfer sovereign
powers to international organisations," it is accepted that such trans-
fer has not taken place in the case of the UN. In consequence,
Chapter VII Resolutions do not have direct effect in the German legal
order, but instead require transposition into domestic law, 117 save for
cases where implementation is achieved by (directly effective) EC
Regulations.11 As a result, unless they are implemented into na-
tional law, Chapter VII Resolutions do not enjoy primacy over
provisions of national law, including national fundamental rights
provisions. However, a general principle of judicial interpretation ex-
ists whereby domestic legislation is presumed to be intended to
comply with international obligations unless there is specific evi-
dence of legislative intention to the contrary. 19
Where Chapter VII Resolutions are implemented by EC law, in
principle the doctrine of primacy of Community law holds that Ger-
man courts have no power to review the EC measure for
compatibility with domestic law. However, the Bundesvervassung-
sgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, or BVerfG) has famously set
what it considers to be the limits of the doctrine of primacy in the
Solange and Brunner judgments. The upshot of these judgments is
essentially that the BVerfG has preserved its final authority to exer-
cise review over EC law if problems relating to fundamental rights
arise, although it has recognized that the EC generally ensures effec-
tive protection of fundamental rights in the EC legal order to a
substantially similar extent as required by the Grundgesetz (German
Constitution).120 This view was most recently repeated in the
117. See, for instance, Federal Court of Justice, judgment of Apr. 12, 1995, Neue
Zeitschrift fuir Strafrecht 1995, 551; judgment of Apr. 21, 1995, BVerfGE in Straf-
sachen, vol 41, 127, 129; and judgment of Sept. 28, 1995, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1996, 602.
118. In some cases, the text of such Regulations has been transposed into domestic
law, although such transposition is not strictly speaking permitted as a matter of EC
law (as Regulations are meant to become part of the national legal order automati-
cally, without transposition). See, for instance, Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb [1977]
ECR 137, REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES (Erika De Wet et al.
eds., 2003), at 47 and Jochen Frowein & Nico Krisch, Germany, in NATIONAL IMPLE-
MENTATION, supra note 99, at 243-44.
119. See the decision of the BVerfG of March 26, 1987, BVerfGE, vol 74, 358, 370,
and the judgment of the Federal Court of Justice of September 28, 1995, Neue Juris-
tische Wochenschrift, 1996, 603.
120. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1974] 2 CMLR 540 ("Solange I"), Re
Wuinsche Handelsgesellschaft (1987] 3 CMLR 225 ("Solange II"), Brunner v. The Eu-
ropean Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57 ("Maastricht"). Thus, in its Bananas decision
of June 7, 2000, the BVerfG ruled inadmissible a claim that EC Regulations on the
common market organization in bananas breached fundamental rights set out in the
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BVerfG's June 2009 Lisbon decision, 121 in which it rejected claims
that the integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights under the
Treaty of Lisbon would necessarily infringe German constitutional
rights;122 yet, the Court also emphasized the importance of true dem-
ocratic control-at present, achievable only at the domestic level-
over areas affecting fundamental rights. 23 Such areas include, in
particular, criminal law as well as "justice and home affairs.' 24 In
sum, a decision by the German courts to exercise this residual power
to review measures for compatibility with fundamental rights would
be unlikely, although not impossible, since it would necessitate a
holding that the EC legal order in general failed to deliver an ade-
quate level of rights protection.
In contrast, where a Chapter VII Resolution is implemented by
means of domestic measures the German courts retain jurisdiction to
review such norms for compatibility with fundamental rights as set
out in the Grundgesetz. An obvious potential conflict is that between
obligations flowing from a Chapter VII Resolution and Article 14 of
the Grundgesetz, which protects the fundamental right to property,
subject to restrictions that are justified and proportionate to the aim
pursued. However, interferences with existing contracts relating to
foreign trade (for instance, in the case of embargos) have been held
not to contravene this right, due to the unstable nature of such trade
and the fact that such interferences are generally foreseeable. 25 In
cases where such rights are breached, it would seem likely that the
German courts would find the breach not to flow necessarily from
Germany's obligation to implement Chapter VII Resolutions, but
rather from the exercise of discretion at the national level in achiev-
ing such implementation. In a variety of cases to date, the German
Grundgesetz, declaring that the human rights protection in the EC legal order was
still generally comparable to that in the German legal order, BVerfGE, 102.
121. BVerfG's Lisbon decision of June 30, 2009, available at http://www.bundesver
fassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630-2bve000208en.html, paras. 191 &
337.
122. Id., paras. 188 et seq.
123. Id., para. 212.
124. Id., paras. 253 ("In [the criminal law] context, which is of importance as re-
gards fundamental rights, a transfer of sovereign powers beyond intergovernmental
cooperation may only under restrictive preconditions lead to harmonisation for cer-
tain cross-border circumstances; the Member States must, in principle, retain
substantial space of action") & 319.
125. See further, Frowein & Krisch, supra note 118, at 257. Further possible con-
flicts may arise with regard to the fundamental right to privacy. In German law, this
encompasses a right of data protection (Informationelle Selbstbestimmung, or "infor-
mational self-determination"), itself linked to the protection of human dignity and
personal liberty guaranteed by the Grundgesetz and subject to proportionate limita-
tions (Grundgesetz, Arts. 1(1) & (2)(1). For the right of informational self-
determination, see the Population Census decision of the BVerfG, December 15, 1983,
decisions vol. 65, 1). Pursuant to a Feb. 2008 decision of the BVerfG, it also extends to
a right to confidentiality in information technology systems, save in a case of a con-
crete threat to life, personal liberty or state institutions.
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courts have struck down domestic measures flowing broadly from
Chapter VII Resolutions but in all these cases, German implementa-
tion involved the exercise of discretion. A recent example is the June
2009 judgment of the Munich Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional
Court) in the Saeed S. case, which concerned criminal charges
brought against a German-Iranian businessman who had supplied
trucks to Iran in contravention of the German trade embargo with
Iran. The terms of the embargo went beyond the requirements of the
EU's sanctions but, according to the German government's conten-
tion, were necessary to avoid a "significant threat to Germany's
foreign relations," as such trucks might be used as rocket launchers
against, in particular, Israel. In holding that the prosecution could
not proceed, the Oberlandesgericht indicated that the German em-
bargo disproportionately infringed economic freedom and was
incompatible with the more lenient EU sanctions regime. 126 How-
ever, the BVerfG's decision in Gorgilii suggests that it would be
unlikely that national measures implementing Chapter VII Resolu-
tions, even directly, would be granted immunity from judicial review
under German law-although the case was not concerned with a con-
flict between a national constitutional right and a Chapter VII
Resolution, but rather between such a right and an ECHR right.127
In that case, the BVerfG emphasized once again the ultimate
supremacy of the Grundgesetz over international agreements to
which Germany is a party-in that case, the ECHR-while reiterat-
ing that all German courts were obliged to interpret ordinary and
constitutional law in accordance with the ECHR, as interpreted by
the ECtHR.
F. The ECJ's Judgment in Kadi
When the Kadi appeal came before the ECJ that court had a
number of options, bearing in mind the source of the obligation being
implemented (the SC), the alleged superiority of that obligation over
EC law (based on Article 103, UN Charter), the lack of discretion
within the impugned regime (the 1267 regime), and the apparent for-
eign affairs nature of the measure. Rather than avoid subjecting the
asset-freezing regime to strict rights-based scrutiny on any or all of
these bases, the ECJ in fact conducted a strict rights-based review of
the contested Regulation.
126. An appeal is currently pending before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of
Justice). A further example is the case of Metin Kaplan, which concerned a request
from the Turkish government for the extradition of the leader of a banned Islamic
fundamentalist group, "Caliphate State," where the court was not convinced by diplo-
matic assurances provided by Turkey that Kaplan's treatment and prosecution would
conform with human rights obligations. Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf, judgment of
May 27, 2003, 4Ausl (a) 308/02-147.203-204.03m.
127. BVerfG, Order of Oct. 14, 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, reported in NJW 2004, 3407.
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The first issue considered by the ECJ was whether the choice of
Articles 60, 301, and 308 EC as legal bases for the contested Regula-
tion was correct. As use of these legal bases is standard practice in
the EC smart sanctions regime, the potential implications of this is-
sue were considerable. However, the ECJ approved the use of these
legal bases, upholding the outcome-although not the reasoning-of
the CFI's judgment on this point. To begin, the ECJ confirmed that
Articles 60 and 301 EC in themselves would not, contrary to the Com-
mission's submissions on appeal, have been sufficient legal bases for
smart sanctions such as the contested Regulation. The Commission's
approach on this point was motivated by its preference, typical in le-
gal basis disputes, for use of legal bases requiring qualified majority
voting in the Council (as with Articles 60 and 301 EC), rather than
unanimity of voting (as with Article 308 EC). Although Advocate
General Maduro had found the Commission's argument on this point
convincing, 128 the ECJ rejected such an extensive interpretation of
Articles 60 and 301 EC, which in their wording refer only to restric-
tive measures as regards third countries. As a result, smart sanctions
such as those at issue in the contested Regulation, which were "nota-
ble for the absence of any link to the governing regime of a third
country, ' 129 could not reasonably be based on these articles alone. 130
The ECJ's preference for a textual interpretation is clearly right: any
attempt artificially to inflate the scope of a legal basis provision be-
yond its natural meaning flies in the face of the principle of conferred
powers, 131 a fundamental principle of EU constitutional law whereby
the EU has competence to act only insofar as such competence has
been expressly granted to it by the masters of the Treaties, the mem-
ber states. 132
It followed that the addition of Article 308 EC as a third legal
basis for the contested Regulation was indeed necessary. In so con-
cluding, however, the ECJ rejected the CFI's reasoning to the effect
that Article 308 EC formed a bridge enabling economic sanctions in
the sense of Articles 60 and 301 EC wherever necessary to achieve an
objective of the CFSP.' 33 Once again, the ECJ preferred a narrower,
more textual interpretation of Article 308 EC, noting that this article
enables measures to be passed where necessary to achieve an objec-
128. Kadi, supra note 1, Opinion, paras. 11-16.
129. Id., para. 167.
130. Id., paras. 166-70.
131. Art. 5(1) EC.
132. Judicial attempts to do so in the past-in more borderline cases than the pre-
sent-have drawn criticism for judicial activism as illegitimate expansion of the EU's
competences without sign-off by the Member States (so-called "competence creep").
See, for instance, the multitude of cases on the scope of Art. 95 EC (e.g., Case C-376/
98 Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR 1-8419).
133. Kadi, supra note 1, paras. 194-205.
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tive of the EC, not one of the CFSP.134 Effectively, the CFI's
argument sought to blur the distinction between the EC and the
CFSP-and thus the constitutional structure on which the EU Trea-
ties are based. Instead, the ECJ adopted a more traditional mode of
reasoning, whereby recourse to Article 308 EC was justified in fur-
therance of a Community aim which, although not explicitly set out
in Articles 60 and 301 EC, could be objectively implied from those
articles, 135 particularly as unilateral national measures in this area
"could create distortions of competition" contrary to the aims of the
common market. 136 This followed the ECJ's previous jurisprudence
on Article 308 EC, holding that this provision enables measures that
do not go beyond the general framework of the EC Treaty as a
whole. 137 It also, however, implies that any "generalised"' 38 asset-
freezing measure must, in principle, be taken at the Community,
rather than national level, as Community law does not permit Mem-
ber States to take action that risks compromising the common
market. 139
The ECJ then considered the relationship between EU law and
international law as a necessary preliminary point prior to consider-
ing whether the applicants' fundamental rights had been infringed by
the contested Regulation. Here, the ECJ's approach differed funda-
mentally from the CFI's. The CFI had adopted a monist approach to
the relationship between international and EU law, holding that
Chapter VII Resolutions were in principle excluded from review by
the EU's courts, save where they were in breach ofjus cogens.140 Put
otherwise, the CFI's approach meant that the validity of interna-
tional law could only be reviewed for compatibility with another norm
of the international legal order, but not with norms of the EU legal
order. In reaching such a conclusion, the CFI regarded itself bound by
Article 103 of the UN Charter.141 This approach, however, had been
criticized by many commentators as itself going beyond the bounds
permitted by international law:142 it would effectively have enabled
134. Id., para. 198.
135. Id., paras. 226 et seq.
136. Id., para. 230.
137. See, for instance, Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR 1-1759, in which the ECJ held that
accession to the ECHR would go beyond the framework of the Treaty in its present
form (although such accession has been specifically enabled by the Treaty of Lisbon,
which came into force on December 1, 2009).
138. Kadi, supra note 1, 230.
139. See, for instance, Art. 10 EC. See also Art. 215(2) of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union.
140. Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat [2005] ECR 11-3533, para. 277 and Case
T-315/01 Kadi [20051 ECR 11-3649, para. 226.
141. Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat [2005] ECR 11-3533, para. 273 and Case
T-315/01 Kadi [2005] ECR 11-3649, para. 222.
142. See, for instance, Jessica Almqvist, A Human Rights Critique of European
Judicial Review: Counter-Terrorism Sanctions 57 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 303 (2008).
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unilateral review of the act of an international organization in a man-
ner other than that provided for by the international legal order itself
(i.e., review by the International Court of Justice).143 The ECJ, fol-
lowing Advocate General Maduro's Opinion on this point, rejected
this approach entirely. It preferred what is essentially a dualist ap-
proach: review of Chapter VII Resolutions themselves falls outside
the jurisdiction of the EU courts, but measures implementing such
Resolutions within the EU legal order may be reviewed for compli-
ance with EU fundamental rights norms. The autonomy of the
Community legal system which, pursuant to Article 220 EC, is exclu-
sively assured by the EU's courts, could not, the ECJ held, be affected
by an international agreement. 144 As respect for fundamental rights
formed an "integral part" of the general principles of Community law,
and as measures incompatible with respect for human rights were
"not acceptable in the Community," it followed that "the obligations
imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prej-
udicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include
the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental
rights."'4 5
Having thus set up the parameters for its jurisdiction in a pro-
foundly dualist manner, the ECJ attempted to offer reassurance that
it was not thereby challenging the primacy of international law in
two ways. First, the ECJ emphasized that its review applied only to
the Community act "intended to give effect to the international agree-
ment at issue"-in this case, the contested Regulation-and not to
the international agreement "as such."146 The CFI had therefore ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction in purporting to review a Chapter VII
Resolution, albeit on the limited grounds ofjus cogens. Second, recal-
ling its case law set out in Part II of this essay (holding that the EC
must respect international law in the exercise of its powers), the ECJ
noted the particular status of Chapter VII Resolutions, and held that
the Community was bound to "attach special importance" to the fact
that such Resolutions constituted the exercise of the "primary re-
sponsibility" invested in the UN "for the maintenance of peace and
security at the global level."' 47 However, and this point was crucial,
the UN Charter did not "impose the choice of a particular model" for
143. Such review would admittedly be difficult to achieve, being possible only by
way of (1) consultative opinion referred by a majority within one of the organs of the
UN empowered under the UN Charter to make such a referral; or (2) in the context of
dispute resolution between UN Member States (as natural or legal persons cannot
bring actions before the ICJ) which raises the issue of the validity of a Chapter VII
Resolution.
144. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 282.
145. Id., paras. 283-85.
146. Id., para. 286.
147. Id., para. 294.
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implementing such Resolutions. 148 Nor could any provision of the EC
Treaty authorize any derogation from the fundamental rights princi-
ples which formed a foundation of the EU. 149 In particular, even
though Articles 297 and 307 EC could in principle allow for unilateral
derogations from other vital areas of EC external policy-for in-
stance, the EC's common commercial policy-these provisions could
in no case "be understood to authorise any derogation from the princi-
ples of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a foundation
of the Union."150
As a separate point, the ECJ considered arguments that it
should follow the approach of the ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati,
i.e., decline jurisdiction to review the compatibility of measures im-
plementing Chapter VII Resolutions, as discussed above. Rejecting
such arguments, the ECJ reasoned that these cases, involving acts
directly attributable to the UN, were "fundamentally different" to the
case at hand, concerning measures which were not so attributable.
Crucially, however, the ECJ held that it would have reached the
same conclusion without this fundamental difference.' 5 ' Attribution,
therefore, was not decisive for the integrity of fundamental rights'
place within the internal legal order.
Moreover, the ECJ went on to reject the Commission's argument
that a Solange-type approach should be adopted, similar to that of
the German Constitutional Court discussed above, under which the
ECJ should forego any review of the contested Regulation because in
the UN's system of sanctions as a whole, fundamental rights were
adequately protected.' 5 2 Although recognizing that improvements
had been made to the listing and delisting procedures, the ECJ found
that this could not give rise to "generalised immunity from jurisdic-
tion" within the EC legal order, as the essentially diplomatic
delisting procedure before the Sanctions Committee did not guaran-
tee judicial protection. 5 3
Finally, the ECJ went on to consider whether the applicants' fun-
damental rights had been breached in the instant case. Dealing with
this shortly, it held that the rights of the defense, particularly the
right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review of those
rights, had "patently" not been respected.1 5These rights required
that the Community communicate the grounds for inclusion on a
148. Id., para. 298.
149. Id., para. 303.
150. Id., para. 303. The ECJ expressly distinguished Case C-124/95 Centro-Com
[1997] ECR 1-81, in which Art. 307 EC was held, under certain conditions to allow
derogations from the EC's common commercial policy.
151. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 315: "In addition and in any event..."
152. Id., paras. 318-19.
153. Id., paras. 321-26.
154. Id., paras. 334-72.
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blacklist to the person or entity concerned, "so far as possible, either
when that inclusion is decided on or, at the very least, as swiftly as
possible after that decision."1 55 In the interests of effectiveness of the
measure, the ECJ held that neither communication of the measure
nor a hearing of the affected party was required prior to the taking of
the decision. Rather, a balance was necessary between security con-
cerns to protect sources on the one hand, and the needs of procedural
justice on the other.156 In the present case, however, as no justifica-
tory information had been communicated to the applicants
whatsoever, there had been an unjustifiable and patent breach of
fundamental rights. Similarly, the ECJ agreed with Kadi's argument
that his right to property had been violated. Although recognizing
that this right was not absolute and that, in principle, asset freezing
measures might be justified by fundamental objectives of counter-ter-
rorism, the ECJ considered that in Kadi's case no such justification
existed.' 57 This was, once again, because no reasonable opportunity
had been given to him to put his case to the competent authorities. As
a result, the contested Regulation was annulled as regards the appli-
cants. The ECJ exercised its discretion under Article 231 EC,
however, to maintain the Regulation's effects for up to three months
from the judgment's date of delivery.
Following the judgment, the EU sought from the Sanctions Com-
mittee the relevant statements of reasons forming the basis for the
applicants' listing and communicated these to the applicants for com-
ment. Having evaluated the comments received, and just within the
ECJ's three month deadline, the Commission adopted a new Regula-
tion maintaining the applicants on the blacklist. 58
IV. KADfs EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SIGNIFICANCE
Does the ECJ's decision in Kadi represent a new, or at least a
different, way of considering norm conflicts operating on states as a
result of the multiple layers of international obligations they now op-
erate under? In order to answer this question, we must consider the
framing decisions of respective courts. In all of the pre-Kadi decisions
on the relationship between security-based obligations flowing from
SC Resolutions and human rights law obligations we have surveyed
in this Article, the matter of framing has been germane to the out-
come. Critical legal scholars have long accepted that judicial
institutions frame certain disputes in a particular way in order to
arrive at a certain result. 59 Such framing is a particularly realist
155. Id., para. 336.
156. Id., para. 344.
157. Id., paras. 359-71.
158. Regulation 1190/2008 of Nov. 28, 2008 OJ 2008 L 322/25.
159. See generally DUNcAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE)
(1997).
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and result-oriented method of judging that, some observers claim, al-
lows for judicial biases, politics, and preferences to flow into and
effectively determine a legal dispute. Framing decisions inevitably
influence the outcome of disputes, but they also enable a court to de-
termine the audience for its decision (beyond the parties immediately
involved) and to sculpt the legal-and at times politico-legal-mes-
sage that is to be delivered. In the case of Kadi, there were in fact two
audiences to whom two discrete-although connected-messages
were being communicated. On the one hand there was the ECJ's "in-
ternal" audience, i.e., the EU, its Member States and EU citizens. On
the other hand there was the ECJ's "external" audience, i.e., the UN
SC, non-EU states and, potentially, other international organizations
such as the Council of Europe.
A. Framing Decisions in the Jurisprudence Considered
The ECJ's framing of the decision in Kadi determined both the
content and the effectiveness of these messages. However, as is
demonstrated below, such framing and message-communication has
long been a feature of cases relating to norm conflicts between secur-
ity and rights obligations. In the pre-Kadi jurisprudence considered
in this Article, we identify five decisional frames some of which have
overlapped within the cases at times. These are: (1) jurisdictional
competence, (2) concentration on the source of the impugned mea-
sure, (3) deference, (4) primacy of the local legal order, and (5) human
rights equivalence.
1. Jurisdictional Competence
Prior to engaging in any substantive consideration of how appar-
ently conflicting obligations are to be resolved a court must satisfy
itself that it has jurisdiction to consider the dispute before it. In two
of the cases considered above-Behrami before the ECtHR and Al-
Jedda before the UK House of Lords-the courts were asked to refuse
jurisdiction on the basis of attribution of responsibility for the im-
pugned actions or, to put it differently, for lack of jurisdiction ratione
personae. In both of these cases the respondents argued that the acts
impugned were in fact attributable to the UN rather than the indi-
vidual states. The attribution decisions in both of these cases
necessarily determined the extent to which the net question of norm
conflict could be engaged in. Both courts reacted differently to these
arguments relating to attribution: in Behrami the ECtHR accepted
that in the particular circumstances of the case the respondent states
were acting under the authority of the UN and, as a result, that their
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actions were not justiciable before the court. 160 In Al-Jedda, in con-
trast, the House of Lords held that the actions impugned were carried
out by UK forces acting for the United Kingdom, not for the UN. The
question of attribution in both cases was open to alternative interpre-
tations-it has been forcefully argued that, in terms of the
international legal principles of state responsibility, the respondent
states in Behrami should have been considered as acting under their
own authority and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the court; 16 1
in Al-Jedda the UK forces were acting within a multi-national force
and, although under UK command, could have been constructed as
acting on behalf of the UN (as, indeed, Lord Hoffman's dissent con-
cluded was the case). The courts in question therefore essentially
determined the extent to which the respective states' actions could be
considered in depth by means of deciding on the matter of attribution
and, a priori, jurisdiction ratione personae. Determination of the ju-
risdictional question can therefore act as a means of avoiding the
question of norm conflict and particularly of the extent to which SC
Resolutions can impinge upon, nullify, or qualify treaty-based human
rights entitlements.
A separate type of jurisdiction-based decision is that of the ECJ
in cases like Segi and Gestoras in which the ECJ has declined juris-
diction to review EU (CFSP or JHA) acts implementing Chapter VII
Resolutions for compliance with fundamental rights. In these cases,
the status of the impugned measures as EU, rather than EC, acts has
been clear, meaning that the question of attribution has not generally
been controversial (although, as discussed in Part III, the ECJ ex-
panded the scope of its own jurisdiction in cases like Segi by looking
at the substance, rather than the form, of a JHA measure to enable it
to carry out review). In the case of CFSP measures-including Com-
mon Positions-the EU Treaty leaves no scope in its present form for
any review by the ECJ. Although the blatant lacuna in judicial pro-
tection resulting from this state of affairs was expressly challenged in
the cases discussed, ultimately it can only be changed by the EU
Member States by way of Treaty amendment. 162 Their decision not to
extend the ECJ's jurisdiction to CFSP matters to date is a very delib-
erate one, reflecting the highly sensitive nature of this policy area,
the reluctance of many Member States to proceed to an advanced
level of integration in this field, and a certain distrust of the ECJ's
160. See analogously, the judgment of the ECtHR in Boivin v. France, Belgium and
32 other States of the Council of Europe, Application No. 73250/01, judgment of Sep-
tember 9, 2008.
161. Marko Milanovic & Tatjana Papic, As Bad as it Gets: The European Court of
Human Rights's Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law 58
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 267 (2009).
162. See the changes which have been brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon refer-
enced at supra note 24.
394 [Vol. 58
HeinOnline  -- 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 394 2010
INTER-JURISDICTIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUES
tendency to "constitutionalise" areas in which it is given
jurisdiction. 163
2. The Source of the Impugned Measure
Closely related to the jurisdictional analysis of attribution is the
question of the source of the impugned measure-does the challenged
measure emanate from the local legal system or from the UN system
and, if the former, are there grounds for determining that the local
measure is at all distinguishable from the international measure or
are they, in fact, identical so that judicial review of the local measure
effectively constitutes judicial review of the international measure?
This distinction appears to have been within the consciousness of
judges in various jurisdictions considered in this Article. It is re-
flected in the extent to which the state in question enjoys a degree of
discretion, or as the Conseil d'Etat has put it, the extent to which the
impugned measure if domestic can be said to be severable from the
international measure.
As mentioned above, in Bosphorous the measure impugned
before both the ECJ and the ECtHR was the local measure, i.e., the
Regulation. By focusing on the European measure neither court was
compelled to broaden its material investigation beyond the point of
considering whether a European measure complied with a European
standard (the rights-protecting standards and principles of both the
EU and the ECHR being construed as providing equivalent levels of
effectively protected fundamental rights).164 Where the measures im-
pugned are seen as local measures, then, the broader general
international law question of the nature and impact of Article 103
can be avoided thus evading criticisms based on the institutional ap-
propriateness of judicial review of the measure. Where the source of
the impugned measures was said to be the UN SC, however, the rigor
of the judicial review was generally lessened. In Al-Jedda, for exam-
ple, although the House of Lords attributed the actions complained of
to the United Kingdom, it construed those actions as being compelled
by a Chapter VII Resolution and therefore as being capable of qualify-
ing rights under the ECHR. In other words, the source of the
obligation itself was said to determine the extent of the applicant's
enjoyment of a right protected and secured by both an international
treaty to which the state was a party (the ECHR) and a piece of do-
mestic law incorporating and implementing that international treaty
(the Human Rights Act 1998). In contrast, in A & Ors the measures
impugned were domestic measures (Orders in Council) introduced
pursuant to a piece of domestic legislation (the United Nations Act
163. See the cases referred to at infra note 187.
164. See the ECJ's explanation of the distinction between Behrami and the
ECtHR's Bosphorus judgment in Kadi, supra note 1, paras. 312-13.
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1946) and implementing an international obligation (SC Resolutions
1267 and 1373). Since the actions complained of were in fact done
under the authority of a domestic instrument, the court could find
that domestic courts could hear an application for judicial review
from a person whose assets were frozen under these orders-includ-
ing the A1-Qaida Order implementing the Consolidated List under
Resolution 1267-and could impose conditions on that judicial review
(such as the appointment of a Special Advocate) in order to ensure
the effective protection of individual rights.
Thus, by framing a dispute relating to the impact of a SC Resolu-
tion as one that essentially concerns local legal measures such as
implementing instruments, courts can simultaneously assert their
capacity for judicial review and avoid considering questions of gen-
eral international law and particularly of how conflicting obligations
are to be dealt with under Article 103 of the UN Charter. Such fram-
ing keeps courts within the substantive legal territory with which
they are familiar and can provide for a local-level mechanism for
rights protection where the rights violations ultimately arise out of
the creation of obligations on the international level. As is clear from
the case of A & Ors, however, local framing can itself be problematic
from the perspective of rights protection where the local violations
not only flow from internationally generated obligations but substan-
tively arise from deficits in due process at the international level.
A number of courts considered above, however, have tended to
take into account the degree to which the local legal actors (either at
the state or the regional level) have had discretion in relation to the
implementation of measures from the SC. In other words, in some
cases the analysis as to the source of a particular obligation has in-
volved a consideration of the extent to which the local legal measure
can be said to be so similar to the international measure and to leave
so little discretion to the local legal actors as to make review of the
local measure a proxy review of the international measure. Thus the
extent to which the EU courts subjected implementing measures to
muscular judicial review prior to Kadi appeared to be related to
whether the measures were introduced by the EU using its own pow-
ers and exercising its own discretion as to the operation of the
measures (as was the case in PMOI, Sison, and Ocalan) or whether
the Union had little or no discretion (as was effectively the case in
Bosphorus). In the former cases, the implementing measures were
thoroughly reviewed for their compliance with fundamental rights; in
the latter case, the judicial review was much lighter, with the ECJ-
although not declining jurisdiction to review the local measure-find-
ing the rights restriction to be proportionate to the UN's aim of
putting an end to war in the region. This approach can be contrasted
with cases such as Dorsch Consult, in which the ECJ refused to
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award damages for a local measure implementing Chapter VII Reso-
lutions on the basis that the EC had no choice in such
implementation. 165
A similar pattern is discernible in the French jurisprudence con-
sidered above. Once the domestic implementing measure is said to be
doing nothing more than transplanting an international obligation, it
appears to be free from judicial review because of its categorization as
an "acte de gouvernement" in the field of international relations or
foreign affairs. Where, in contrast, the domestic implementing mea-
sure is said to be "severable" from the international obligation
because, for example, it goes beyond that which is required by the
motivating international obligation, it is subject to judicial review.
Although the Conseil d'Etat has in recent years effectively expanded
the scope of its jurisdiction by narrowing the scope of the concept of
actes de gouvernement, this development has been accompanied by
the adoption of a rather light form of judicial review (as, for instance,
in Association Secours Mondial de France, on the basis that the case
involved defense secrets). The approach of the Munich Ober-
landesgericht in Saeed S., in which the court reviewed a German
implementing measure on the basis that it went beyond the stan-
dards required by the relevant EU and UN measures, is
analogous. 166 On its face, the ratio 167-although not the spirit-of
the ECJ's decision in Kadi itself falls into this category. Thus, the
ECJ emphasized that UN law did not "impose the choice of a particu-
lar model for the implementation of resolutions adopted by the SC...
since they are to be given effect in accordance with the procedure ap-
plicable ... in the domestic legal order of each Member State of the
United Nations."1 68 It followed, in the court's view, that exclusion of
judicial review of the relevant implementing measure was not re-
quired by the principles governing the international legal order.169
The striking dissonance between this statement and the CFI's conclu-
sion that the EC had no "autonomous discretion"'70 in implementing
the local measure illustrates perfectly how controversial, and cru-
cially important, the courts' framing decisions can be. In truth, the
ECJ's finding that there was room for maneuver for the EC in taking
165. Case T-184/95 Dorsch Consult [19981 ECR II-667, upheld on appeal in Case C-
237/98 P. See also Case T-47/03 Sison [2007] ECR II-73.
166. See also, by analogy, the approach of the French Conseil constitutionnel in
Decision nr 2006-540 DC of July 27, 2006, in which it reviewed French measures
implementing an EC Directive on the ground that the precise measures at issue were
not in fact required by the Directive.
167. Although the term is not strictly speaking appropriate for ECJ judgments, the
court not having a formal doctrine of precedent.
168. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 298.
169. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 299.
170. Kadi, supra note 1, CFI, para. 214.
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the implementing measure was artificial.171 Quite apart from this,
however, the ECJ itself suggested that it would have come to the
same conclusion even if no such discretion had existed.' 7 2
3. Deference
The third category of framing is that of deference, by which we
mean the decision by an adjudicating court to afford deference to a
norm-creating or enforcing body. As a result, the impugned measure
is subjected to light (or sometimes no) judicial review because of per-
ceptions that either the institution involved or the subject-matter of
the obligation being implemented are deserving of deference from the
judiciary. In terms of institutional deference, the jurisprudence con-
sidered in Part III above reveals occasional instances of courts acting
in a deferential manner towards the SC because of its perceived posi-
tioning within the international legal order. Thus in Behrami, having
already determined that because the acts complained of were attribu-
table to the UN and therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the court,
the ECtHR went on to remark that SC actions relating to interna-
tional peace and security could not be reviewed by that court because
of the centrality of the maintenance of peace and security to the mis-
sion of the UN and the role reserved to the SC in that arena by the
UN Charter itself. In fact, the court remarked that to do anything
other than afford a high degree of deference to the SC in this relation
would run the risk of interfering with the UN's peace and security
mission and disrupting its operations. While this comment was osten-
sibly obiter dictum (to borrow a common law classification) as the
jurisdictional analysis had already resulted in the case being deemed
inadmissible, it is nevertheless indicative of the high degree of insti-
tutional deference the court was willing to afford to the SC.
The CFI's decision in Kadi also reveals significant institutional
deference towards the SC, following in particular from its findings
that the EC was "bound by the obligations under the Charter of the
United Nations in the same way as its Member States." 17 3 In these
circumstances, "determining what constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace and security and the measures required to maintain or
re-establish them"17 4 was the responsibility of the SC alone and, as
such, measures implementing Chapter VII Resolutions were not sub-
ject to review by the EU courts, save as to compliance withjus cogens.
Although this caveat meant that deference to the SC's choices was
not complete, the fact that the (exceptional) ground of review was it-
171. See similarly, Jacqu6, who complains of hypocrisie in the ECJ's reasoning on
this point (at 169).
172. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 315.
173. Kadi, supra note 1, CFI, para. 193.
174. Kadi, supra note 1, CFI, para. 219.
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self a norm of the international legal order meant that such review
would have diminished the challenge to the SC's authority. A similar
approach has been adopted, for instance, by the Swiss Federal Su-
preme Court, which has declined to review Swiss measures imposing
travel restrictions and freezing assets on the ground that they imple-
mented Chapter VII Resolutions, subject only to review for
compliance with jus cogens.175
The House of Lords' decision in Al-Jedda also reveals some lim-
ited deference to the SC. By acknowledging that SC Resolutions had
the capacity to impose obligations on states that appear incompatible
with their human rights obligations and that the role of the courts in
such circumstances is to assess whether or not the SC obligations
have been implemented with the minimum possible disruption of
rights protections, the Law Lords implicitly deferred to the SC's insti-
tutional adjudication of what is required for the purposes of
maintaining international peace and security whether or not the
rights implications of such measures were effectively considered at
the international level.
In addition to such institutional deference, courts considering the
relationship between obligations flowing from SC Resolutions and
human rights standards have at times also displayed subject-matter
deference. Thus, where the security-related obligations imposed by
SC Resolutions are framed as matters of international relations or
foreign affairs, domestic courts can display a deference based on the
traditional conception of these areas as executive functions that
ought not to be reviewed by the courts. This is particularly evident in
the jurisprudence of the French courts considered above. As a result
of the constitutional commitment to a strict separation of powers
within the French constitutional order, the capacity to review Chap-
ter VII Resolutions and domestic implementing measures has
traditionally been recognized as particularly limited as such mea-
sures are considered to be part of the French conduct of its
international relations. Even where-as in Association Secours
Mondial de France-the measures impugned are considered severa-
ble from the foreign relations power, considerable deference has been
afforded to the executive role in ensuring national security and, in
the course of so doing, in imposing security measures on individuals
based on undisclosed information. The extent to which this approach
is deferential is reflected in the fact that, as noted in Part III above, a
domestic legal procedure specifically geared towards assessing ques-
tions of national security was not utilized by the Conseil d'Etat in this
case.
175. Nada v. State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, Bundesgericht, Nov. 14, 2007,
133 BSE II 540-67.
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Deferential behavior by courts based either on institution (SC) or
subject-matter (national and international security) in rights-based
claims is reflective of a decision to frame a legal dispute as being one
of security v. rights (i.e., as a dichotomous question) rather than one
of security and rights (i.e., as a harmonization question). This is per-
haps best illustrated by the House of Lords' decision in Al-Jedda
where the majority of the Law Lords seemed to assume that there
was a conflict between the obligation to engage in security detention
and the right to be free from arbitrary detention under Article 5
ECHR. Only Baroness Hale appeared to seriously question the extent
to which the actions complained of were in fact required by the rele-
vant Resolutions. While ultimately agreeing with the decision that
where conflicting obligations exist they are to be reconciled by means
of qualifying the rights protected by the ECHR, she stressed the im-
portance of gauging the extent of an obligation in order to fully assess
whether such a conflict arose in any particular circumstance. Such a
fact-based consideration of the extent of an obligation in any given
set of circumstances necessarily involves a court in considering
whether actions complained of were in fact required for security rea-
sons-a non-deferential approach both in terms of institution
(executive, military, and SC) and subject-matter (national and/or in-
ternational peace and security). The failure of most of the Law Lords
to engage in such analysis uncovers the deferential tenor of the deci-
sion in respect of both institution and subject-matter.
4. Primacy of the Local Legal Order
A fourth way of framing conflicts between local human rights
standards and Chapter VII obligations would be for the national
courts, quite simply, to reject the primacy of such Resolutions. One
way in which this can occur is, in dualist jurisdictions, for the court to
rule that no measure implementing the relevant international norm
exists in domestic law. As we saw in Part III, this would be the case,
for instance, with an unimplemented Chapter VII Resolution in
France or Germany. Even where an implementing measure exists,
however, this approach has on occasion been adopted in some juris-
dictions. The reasoning of the German BVerfG in Gorgili is one
instance, although this reasoning dealt with a different conflict of
norms (namely that between the German Grundgesetz and the
ECHR). In the BVerfG's perspective, this outcome flowed inevitably
from the fact that, as a matter of German constitutional law, interna-
tional law ranked lower in the hierarchy of norms than the
Grundgesetz. The local primacy approach is also visible, for instance,
in Medellin v Texas,176 in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
176. 552 US - (2008).
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ICJ judgments do not constitute binding domestic precedent in the
United States.
Some would argue that the ECJ's Kadi decision itself fits into
this category. Despite the ECJ's ostensible affirmation of the doctrine
of primacy of international law,177 the court ultimately, it is argued,
re-asserts the autonomy of the Community legal order and its own
jurisdiction to review, in light of EC rights standards, measures
which effectively transpose Chapter VII Resolutions in a wholesale
manner. 17s As set out below, we reject this argument, asserting in-
stead that the ECJ's approach is a deliberately more subtle one.
5. Human Rights Equivalence
The final way of framing conflicts between legal orders apparent
from our survey is what we will term "human rights equivalence":
that is, a judicial decision not to exercise review of another legal or-
der's norms for compliance with one's own rights standards on the
basis of a determination that, overall, the other order offers
equivalent rights protection. This is the approach famously espoused
by the German BVerfG to allow itself to conclude that, so long as the
EC legal order offers equivalent-although not necessarily identi-
cal-rights protection to that of the German legal order, it will not
exercise its power of review over Community norms. A similar ap-
proach has been adopted in a variety of other national courts viz-a-viz
EC law, and is also evident in the ECtHR's Bosphorus judgment. This
way of framing a potential conflict of legal orders has, within Europe
at least, become a classic judicial means of reaching a compromise
between ensuring continued rights protection, on the one hand, and
the realities of far-reaching international cooperation, on the other.
In its submissions before the ECJ in Kadi, the Commission ar-
gued for the adoption of an analogous approach to the review of
Chapter VII Resolutions in the EU legal order. This would have
meant that the ECJ would "not intervene in any way whatsoever" so
long as, in the sanctions procedure at UN level, a system exists
whereby "the individuals or entities concerned have an acceptable op-
portunity to be heard." 79 The ECJ, however, rejected such an
approach as "unjustified," as the UN's system "clearly ... does not
offer the guarantees of judicial protection." 80 As a result, the ECJ
177. Kadi, supra note 1, paras. 288-99.
178. See Kadi, supra note 1, para. 316; the fact that the ECJ does not refer to Art.
103 of the UN Charter whatsoever; the ECJ's restrictive approach to Art. 307 EC; and
the ECJ's reasoning on the relevance of Art. 300(7): primacy as a result of that article
"would not.., extend to [EC] primary law, in particular to the general principles of
which fundamental rights form part" (para. 308). Contrast, for instance, the CFI in
Kadi, supra note 1, para. 193.
179. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 319.
180. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 322.
20101
HeinOnline  -- 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 401 2010
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
was obliged to review the implementing EC measure for rights com-
pliance.' 8 ' Despite this conclusion on the facts, the ECJ's deliberate
consideration of whether the doctrine applied-and its hint that the
doctrine might in the future apply182 -was clearly aimed at sending
out a message to the UN: get your rights protection in order, and we
will not second-guess you.' 8 3 We argue below that the ECJ is effec-
tively thereby seeking to incentivize the UN to improve its rights
protection regime, and that it is, in this sense, a strategic actor on the
international political plane.
B. Kadi's Internal Message
Kadi has clear implications for the EU's own legal order. In par-
ticular, Kadi offers a further example of the ECJ's willingness to
assume a role as a political actor in shaping the constitutional bal-
ance of power in the EU's internal affairs. 184 Kadi fits in a long line of
cases in which the ECJ has characterized itself as the ultimate judi-
cial arbiter in an autonomous constitutional legal order created by
the EEC Treaty.' 8 5 Although the Community was treaty-based, and
thus ostensibly a typical creature of international law, the ECJ lost
no time in unilaterally declaring that the EEC Treaty was no "ordi-
nary" international treaty;18 6 rather, its Member States had "limited
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields," thus creating a
body of law the subjects of which were not only states (as per typical
international law), but also their nationals.' 8 7
Nonetheless, Kadi represents a constitutionalism of a radically
different nature to that developed by the ECJ in these early cases,
which were ultimately premised on the economic aim of achieving a
181. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 326.
182. See, for instance, para. 326: ECJ was obliged to ensure the review, "in princi-
ple the full review" (our emphasis) of the lawfulness of EC acts designed to give effect
to Chapter VII Resolutions.
183. See also Opinion of AG Maduro, para. 54, who considered that, if sufficient
rights protection had existed at UN level, the ECJ would not have had to review the
impugned measure. See contra this interpretation, however, Daniel Halberstam &
Eric Stein, The United Nations, the European Union and the King of Sweden: Eco-
nomic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order 46 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 13 (2009), who are of the view that the ECJ with Kadi has definitively rejected
any possible application of a human rights equivalence doctrine in such cases.
184. On the ECJ as a political actor, see, for instance, KAREN ALTER, THE EuRo-
PEAN COURT'S POLITICAL POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS (2009).
185. The EEC Treaty is now known as the EC Treaty, following the expansion of
the EEC's aims beyond the purely economic achieved, in particular, with the 1992
Maastricht Treaty.
186. Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593.
187. Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 13. This approach lies at the heart
of its famous early judgments in which it laid down what remain the founding pillars
of EC constitutional law, namely the revolutionary doctrines of primacy of EC law
over national law (Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585) and direct effect (Case
26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 13) of EC law. See generally ALEC STONE SWEET,
THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (2004).
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common market.188 This economic constitutionalism on the ECJ's
part was hugely successful, playing a vital role in pushing often un-
willing Member States and Community institutions towards
completion of the common market goal-although with the inevitable
accompanying criticism that this smacked of judicial activism.18 9 The
aims of the EC (and, since its creation in 1993, the EU) have moved
on significantly beyond the economic and are now founded on the
principles of "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, and the rule of law."19 0  The post-Kadi
constitutional order, expressly rooted in these principles, represents
another step in the ECJ's efforts to construct its vision of a new con-
stitutional order based on rights and social protection. As such, the
judgment should be viewed as complementing not only its fundamen-
tal rights jurisprudence,19 1 but also its case law on the rights of EU
citizens and broader social rights.1 92 In each case, the ECJ seeks to
identify and make effective what it sees as the fundamental princi-
ples of the new constitutional order, albeit emphasizing the
acceptability of a pluralism of social values within such order. 193
While these judgments are also susceptible to the criticism of judicial
activism, they can ultimately be seen as judicial efforts to promote
the democratic legitimacy which the EU still finds so elusive, and
which continues to cause it such problems.1 9 4
Moreover, the ECJ's deliberate emphasis on the centrality of fun-
damental rights to the EU legal order represents a further chapter in
the long-running judicial dialogue between the EU and national
courts concerning the ECJ's doctrine of primacy of Community law
over national law. Although, as noted above, this doctrine was set out
on the ECJ's part as early as the 1970s, it has had a long and at times
188. See Loic Azoulai, Le r6le constitutionnel de la Cour de justice des Com-
munautds europdennes te qu'il se dgage de sa jurisprudence RTD EUR 44(1), janv-
mars 2008, who refers to this concept as le constitutionalisme de marchg.
189. See, for instance, Jospeh Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of
Justice and its Interlocutors 26 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 510 (1994); MIGUEL
MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998); SWEET, supra note 187.
190. Art. 6(1) EU.
191. See supra Part II.
192. See, for instance, Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala [19981 ECR 1-2691, Case C-184/
99 Gryzelczyk [2001] ECR 1-6193, Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR 1-6947, Case
C-192/05 Tas Hagen [2006] ECR 1-451, Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR 1-9981.
See further, Norbert Reich, A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the
Rethinking of Union and Community Law 3 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 131 (1997).
193. See Azoulai, supra note 188 and Miguel Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Eu-
rope's Constitutional Pluralism in Action, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION (Neil Walker
ed., 2003).
194. Evidenced, for instance, by the 2005 rejections of the Constitutional Treaty by
referenda in France and the Netherlands and the 2008 rejection of the Treaty of Lis-
bon in Ireland by referendum (though passed in a second referendum of Oct. 2009).
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difficult-reception by national courts. 195 In many jurisdictions-in-
cluding Germany and France-this doctrine has been accepted only
on the condition of adequate protection of fundamental rights in the
EU legal order. In this sense, Kadi sends out a further message of
reassurance to EU national courts potentially sceptical of the EU's
fundamental rights credentials. Indeed, the EU's muscular judicial
review in Kadi surpasses the standard of review applied to similar
measures in the national EU jurisdictions we examined above. From
this perspective, therefore, Kadi strengthens the doctrine of primacy
of EC law over national law. Ironically, however, the ECJ's external
message from Kadi-its approach to the primacy of international
law-has inevitable, and potentially dangerous, repercussions for
this very doctrine. One of the jurisdictions with the most difficulties
in accepting the doctrine was Germany, and the ultimate equilibrium
arrived at by the Federal Constitutional Court-as set out in the So-
lange and Brunner judgments-has been hugely influential. 19 6 The
ECJ's refusal in Kadi to espouse a Solange approach to review of EC
measures implementing SC Resolutions potentially strengthens the
hand of national courts wishing to re-emphasize that the ultimate
jurisdiction to decide on whether EC or national norms apply lies
with them, and not with the ECJ.197 Put simply, the foreseeable reac-
tion of such courts to Kadi may be: "if the ECJ can adopt this
reasoning, why can't we?" The Federal Constitutional Court's June
2009 Lisbon decision, to which reference has already been made in
Part III, offers an excellent early example of this unintended cross-
fertilization. In considering the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty's
Declaration concerning primacy,19 8 the court used the opportunity to
reaffirm that Germany "does not recognise an absolute primacy of
application of Union law"19 9 and relied expressly on the ECJ's rea-
soning in Kadi to justify this position. Just as the ECJ in Kadi was
justified in choosing, in a "borderline case," to place "the assertion of
its own identity as a legal community above the commitment that it
otherwise respects," so the German courts would be justified in "ex-
ceptionally" declaring EU law inapplicable in Germany.20 0 We
anticipate an analogous approach may be adopted by national courts
195. See, for instance, (Germany) Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1974] 2
CMLR 540 ("Solange I"), Re Winsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225 ("So-
lange II"), Brunner v. The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57 ("Maastricht");
(Italy) Frontini v. Ministero dell Finanze [1974] 2 CMLR 372; (Poland) judgment of
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in Polish Membership of the European Union (Ac-
cession Treaty) K 18/04, May 11, 2005, discussed in the text at supra note 120.
196. Solange II and Brunner, supra note 195.
197. Often described as the Kompetenz-Kompetenz question, i.e., the question of
which court-EU or national-has ultimate power to decide on the scope of the EU's
competences.
198. Declaration No. 17 to the Treaty of Lisbon OJ 2008 C 115/1.
199. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 331.
200. Kadi, supra note 1, para. 340.
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in which primacy of Community law has met with a similarly difficult
reception-a recent example being the Polish courts. 20
A final important aspect of the internal message communicated
by Kadi lies in the ECJ's confirmation that the correct legal bases
had been used in adopting the contested Regulation. Legal basis dis-
putes have over the years formed the battleground for some of the
EU's most highly charged political power struggles. 20 2 Kadi is no ex-
ception. By reaffirming the use of the combination of Articles 60, 301,
and 308 EC for the EU's asset-freezing measures, the ECJ refused to
accede to the wishes of the Commission, which was pushing for a
move away from unanimity of voting to qualified majority voting in
the Council. This is significant because the ECJ thereby ensured a
continuing parallel in the voting rules applicable to the EU measures
implementing Chapter VII Resolutions (common positions), where
unanimity applies, and the EC measures implementing such Resolu-
tions. In other words, Member States retain a veto over EC and EU
implementing measures in this most sensitive of areas. The ECJ's
conclusion will offer reassurance to nervous Member States who are
still smarting from the ECJ's recent willingness to impose qualified
majority voting in another highly sensitive area, namely criminal
justice. 20 3
C. Kadi's External Message
While some commentators have been critical of the ECJ's ap-
proach in Kadi arguing that the decision to focus exclusively on
European law essentially removed the court from engaging in an im-
portant dialogue about the relationship between international and
European law,20 4 we take the view that the court's approach did not
in fact indicate a desire to abstain from this debate but rather a dif-
ferent way of engaging in it. Instead of focusing on the meaning of
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter-the international law of
another international institution which the court neither needed to
consider nor, arguably, was competent to engage in 2 05-the ECJ fo-
cused on the meaning of its own legal principles, structures, and
201. Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in Polish Membership of the
European Union (Accession Treaty) K 18/04, May 11, 2005.
202. See, for instance, Case C-300/89 Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide)
[1991] ECR 1-2867, Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Ad-
vertising) [2000] ECR 1-8419, Case C-176/03 Commission v. Council (Environmental
Criminal Penalties) [2005] ECR 1-7879.
203. Case C-176/03 Commission v. Council (Environmental Criminal Penalties)
[2005] ECR 1-7879, Case C-440/05 Commission v. Council (Ship Source Pollution)
[20071 ECR 1-90907.
204. See particularly Grdinne de Biirca, The EU, the European Court of Justice and
the International Legal Order after Kadi 51(1) HARv. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
205. See Piet Eeckhout, "Kadi and Al Barakaat: Luxembourg is not Texas-or
Washington DC," EJIL: Talk!, February 25, 2009, available at http://www.ejiltalk.
org/kadi-and-al-barakaat-luxembourg-is-not-texas-or-washington-dc/ (July 23, 2009).
20101 405
HeinOnline  -- 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 405 2010
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
fundamental rights jurisprudence. But it did so in the knowledge that
such a focus had the capacity to have an important knock-on effect
within other international institutions. Specifically, the ECJ's deci-
sion in Kadi can, we argue, contribute to the process of international
constitutionalism notwithstanding its dualist nature.
Although a number of commentators such as de Birca,20 6 Pos-
ner, and Goldsmith 207 have argued (to varying degrees) that the Kadi
decision is analogous to the approach of the United States in Medellin
v Texas, 208 we argue that these views do not take sufficient account of
the EU's dual role as an international actor, first in its own right
(politically at least, notwithstanding its lack of legal status to become
a Member State of the UN) and second in the form of its twenty-seven
Member States all of whom participate in international law-making
as part of the international community and all of whom are now fully
aware that the international obligations they help to create will have
to sit comfortably with their obligations as members of the EU. In
addition, the substantive nature of the dispute in both cases is distin-
guishable-Medellin concerned the attempt to bestow positive rights
on individuals through a non-incorporated international treaty (the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963)) pursuant to a deci-
sion of an international court (the International Court of Justice20 9)
whereas Kadi concerned a challenge to the violations of rights al-
ready bestowed within the EU by means of executive action within
that same legal system. 210 Unlike Medellin then, Kadi does not re-
present an isolationist or sovereigutist approach to international law.
Rather we submit that Kadi represents the reassertion of a values-
based commitment to individual rights within the European legal
system that is shared by general international law but which had not
been honored in the asset-freezing regime in operation since the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001.
This conclusion can be reached notwithstanding the fact that the
court did not engage with the terms of Article 103.211 This was a mat-
ter of framing on the part of the ECJ: it chose to frame the question
206. de Bfirca, supra note 204.
207. Eric Posner & Jack Goldsmith, Does Europe Believe in International Law?
WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2008, at A15.
208. 552 US - (2008). For an excellent overview see Margaret McGuinness, Me-
dellin v. Texas 102 AM. IJr'L L. 662 (2008).
209. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)
(Judgment) [2004] ICJ Rep 12.
210. As Eeckhout (supra note 205) has noted, Kadi is therefore more in the mold of
the "classic" constitutional judicial review case than was Medellin.
211. In fact, of the cases considered in Section III above Art. 103 was materially
considered in only one: A1-Jedda. Otherwise the meaning, effect and implications for
human rights law of Art. 103 have been largely avoided by the deciding courts. In
this, the ECJ is not alone. The difference, however, is that the ECJ reached a rights-
protecting conclusion that it indicated could co-exist with general international law
notwithstanding its avoidance of Art. 103.
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exclusively as one of European law. The possible reasons for this are
manifold-it could be that the court felt that an exclusively European
law focus was all that was necessary to resolve the legal questions
raised in the case and that there was no need to consider general
international law; it could also be that the court did not want to en-
gage in a direct review of the relevant SC Resolutions because that
would have required consideration of whether the SC had acted ultra
vires and thus a substantive judicial review of the extent of the SC's
powers (and not merely of whether the Resolution complied with Eu-
ropean fundamental rights standards); or it could be that the court
felt it could do justice in the case and communicate both its internal
and external messages effectively while staying within the local legal
system where its jurisdiction, expertise and capacity to compel com-
pliance were undisputed. The last option seems, to us, the most
probable.
The internal message, as discussed above, is one of European
constitutional significance that has a pedigree in the court's own ju-
risprudence. The external message, however, can be read either (as
some commentators have done) as one of the superiority of the local
legal system (i.e., European law)2 12 or, as we do, as one of the superi-
ority of shared values of fundamental rights. Kadi in our view is not a
case that ought to be read as holding that there is something
uniquely important about European law, but rather as a decision
that communicates the message that there is something uniquely im-
portant about individual rights protection. It stresses the need to
ensure that all measures taken by states acting together, even in the
important area of national and international peace and security,
must be designed in a manner that recognizes the importance of indi-
vidual rights protection and of an institutional commitment to
fundamental rights that can not be swept aside for the purposes of
expediency. Although the court claims to be concerned only with Eu-
ropean law and with a review of the implementing measures within
European law itself, its broader external message is clearly extracta-
ble: if the SC is to introduce measures of this kind under Chapter VII
Resolutions then those measures as implemented within the EU
must reach certain minimum standards of rights protection. Thus,
what some have termed the ECJ's fragmentation of international
law2 13 and others have deemed a commitment to pluralism in inter-
national law21 4 is to us rather an assertion of the commonalities in
212. See, for instance, de Bfirca, supra note 204.
213. Katja Ziegler, Strengthening the Rule of Law but Fragmenting International
Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ From the Perspective of Human Rights 9 HuMAN
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 288 (2009).
214. See, for instance, de Bfirca, supra note 204. Pluralism in international law
promotes the recognition that there are various diverse normative systems that can
co-exist. This is in contrast to dualism, which recognizes that there are different legal
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values between two international institutions upon which an inter-
institutional (ECJ and SC) and inter-organizational (EU and UN) di-
alogue can be based. It is, in other words, a constitutionalist case.
The constitutional commitment to rights protection that under-
pins the EU is analogous to the constitutional commitment to human
rights that underpins the UN. In both organizations the protection
and promotion of fundamental rights is expressly constitutionalized.
Thus, Article 6(1) EU provides that the union is founded on the prin-
ciples of "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are com-
mon to the member states" and Article 1(3) of the UN Charter
provides that achieving international cooperation in the promotion
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 215 It is at least
arguable that the SC is subject to a legally binding obligation to re-
spect human rights in the course of its operations, including in
shaping Chapter VII Resolutions. 216 Not only is rights protection a
fundamental mission of both of these organizations, but in both the
EU and the UN this protective commitment seems constitutionally
designed to limit the actions of the various institutions within those
organizations. The ECJ, therefore, in Kadi and (as discussed above)
in its previous jurisprudence had asserted the right to strike mea-
sures down for non-compliance with fundamental rights protections.
Analogously, Article 24(2) of the UN Charter provides that "the SC
shall act in accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the
United Nations" in discharging its duties. As illustrated above,
rights-protection is one of those principles and purposes and there
seems to be nothing in Article 24(2) to suggest a hierarchy between
rights and security in terms of the SC's obligation to act in a manner
consistent with the organization's principles and purposes. In fact, in
2005, the then-Secretary General Kofi Annan expressly constructed
both of these purposes and principles as being co-existent and co-de-
pendent within the UN order.217 Not only is there is a commonality
in the constitutional positioning of rights-protection between the UN
and the EU but the civil and political rights in question in Kadi, al-
though framed as "European" fundamental rights, are in no way
unique to the European legal order. As considered in Part II, the
right to due process is also protected in international human rights
law. It was represented as a European right in Kadi because the legal
systems governing internal and external spheres but that the internal legal system
has primacy within domestic law and courts over the external system.
215. See also Art. 55, Charter of the United Nations.
216. ERICA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL 191-200 (2004).
217. KOFI ANNAN, IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL (2005).
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dispute in question was considered within a framework of European
law, but this does not mean that their relevance and content of Euro-
pean rights are different from those rights within the international
sphere.
Thus, by framing and considering the questions in Kadi as ques-
tions of European law, governed by the EU's autonomous legal
system, the ECJ was simultaneously restricting itself to its own area
of legal competence and expertise (or, acting in a dualist manner) and
propounding values, standards, and a commitment to judicial review
of rights violations as a fundamental element of the rule of law that
are part of the constitutional values underpinning both the European
and the international legal order. The court could, therefore, avoid
allegations of subjecting the SC itself to judicial review, thereby act-
ing outside of its institutional and organizational competencies, while
at the same time progressing and engaging in the project of interna-
tional constitutionalism in a manner that stresses the nature of
rights and security as coexistent, co-dependent, and coequal values
within international law. We are conscious of Joseph Weiler's edito-
rial comment that "'reading into the decision' [in Kadi] a dialogical
element reminiscent of the Solange jurisprudence" is an example of
"beauty that comes from the eye of the beholder, not from the text of
the Decision."218 Still, we are of the view that seen in its context and
particularly by reference to the conscious framing decisions of the
court, such an external message seems both actuated and intended.
V. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF KADi IN REAL TERMS
Seen in its context, Kadi contains important internal and exter-
nal constitutional messages about the role of fundamental rights in
times of perceived instability in international peace and security and
about the need for the international legal system to be cognizant of
the other layers of obligations that states must comply with. While,
under international law, these obligations may be inferior to those
flowing from Chapter VII Resolutions (and the ECJ made no finding
as to the hierarchy of norms in general international law whatso-
ever), the effect of Kadi is that, when acting within the EU, states'
local fundamental rights obligations under EU law are supreme. As
noted in Part IV, the court's method of framing the questions raised
in Kadi allowed it to negotiate a path towards communicating both
these external and internal messages without it being subjected to
the criticism of jurisdictional expansionism. Nonetheless, the extent
to which the court has in fact managed to effect real change in both
its external and its internal spheres of influence by means of Kadi
218. Joseph Weiler, Editorial, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 895,
896 (2008).
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does not present altogether as bright a picture as might have been
hoped.
At the EU level, as noted above, Kadi had the immediate practi-
cal effect that the applicants were informed of the reasons for their
listing and had the opportunity to make comments on these reasons,
but were ultimately maintained on the blacklist. As this merely dealt
with the ECJ's concerns in the individual case at hand, in April 2009,
the Commission put forward a legislative proposal to extend these
rights generally to all individuals and entities newly listed by the UN
and falling within the scope of the EU's implementing legislation. 219
In particular, the effect of the proposal would be to bring the listing
procedure in such cases in line with the procedure followed in draw-
ing up the EU's own blacklists, 220 ensuring that listed persons or
entities would be told of the reasons for listing "without delay" and
allowing the listed person or entity to submit comments on such list-
ing.22 1 A special regime, however, would apply to "classified
information" submitted to the Commission by the UN or a state, re-
quiring the consent of the originator of the information prior to its
release. 222 Nonetheless, there remain serious questions whether this
post-Kadi procedure truly ensures effective protection of the right of
defense, and in particular whether the nature of the information com-
municated to listed persons enables them effectively to exercise their
right to be heard. Particular problems may well arise with regard to
the effectiveness of judicial protection where listing decisions are
based on classified information, given the CFI's holding in PMOI that
a failure to communicate such information-even to the court alone-
made judicial review of the listing decision impossible. 223 Such ques-
tions have led Mr Kadi and A1-Bakaraat to challenge the EU's
response to the ECJ's judgment, which challenge is currently pending
before the CFI and may well ultimately fall once again to the ECJ, on
appeal, to determine.224
219. Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation 88112002, COM
(2009) 187 final. The scope of the Regulation is set out in Art. 11, and includes all
Member State nationals, and legal persons incorporated or constituted under the law
of a Member State and in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the
Community.
220. Regulation 2580/2001 OJ 2001 L 344/70.
221. Proposal, Art. 7a. The comitology procedure (whereby the Commission, in its
decision-making process, is assisted by a committee) is to apply to the decision taken
(Art. 7b).
222. Proposal, Art. 7d. The proposal also includes provisions governing the process-
ing of data, including data concerning offences and security measures, relating to
listed individuals: Proposal, Art. 7e.
223. Case T-228/02 PMOI [2006] ECR 11-4665, para. 155 and Case T-284108 PMOI
[20081 ECR II-0000, para. 76. See similarly, Joined cases T-246/08, T-332/08 Melli
Bank v. Council, para. 46.
224. Case T-85/09 Kadi and T-45/09 Al-Bakaraat. In the meantime, the Kadi prin-
ciples have been applied, for instance, by the CFI in Case T-318/01 Othman [2009]
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At the international level, the Sanctions Committee under Reso-
lution 1267 appears to take the view that Resolutions introduced
prior to Kadi being handed down, but after the point at which Kadi
had been included on the Consolidated List, bring the Committee and
the Council much closer to a situation of due regard for individual
rights. In particular, the Committee's then-Chairperson, Jan Grauls,
expressed the view before the SC in December 2008 that Resolution
1822 (2008) "represent[ed] a milestone in the life of the [Sanctions]
Committee" in terms of rights protection. While Resolution 1822 pro-
vides for narrative reasons for listing decisions to be provided, it does
not appear to actually resolve the rights-protection deficits that arise
within the processes of the Sanctions Committee. Grauls also pointed
towards the Focal Point process, by which a listed entity can directly
apply for delisting, but this process remains deeply political with con-
sulted states having the capacity to ensure that the delisting request
itself never reaches the Committee's meeting agenda. Grauls' empha-
sis on Resolution 1822 and on the existence of the Focal Point process
rightly identifies that these mark rights-based progression from the
Committee's starting point, but they do not constitute an adequate
level of rights protection and do not appear likely to meet the funda-
mental rights standards of the EU. Importantly, Grauls made it clear
that he and the Committee were aware of the external pressure to
improve the sanctions process from a human rights perspective. 225
Thus, while the SC may not have gone as far as the ECJ pre-
scribed in Kadi, that decision has placed "[d]ue respect for fair and
clear procedures" 226 firmly on the Sanctions Committee's agenda.227
That this has not resulted in an immediate volte face and an exercise
of rights-proofing the sanctions regime does not mean that the ECJ
has either failed to identify itself as an international interlocutor in
the dialogue about the relationship between security and rights nor
that, even if it has so identified itself, it has failed to bring about
effective change. A pattern of dialogue between courts and other gov-
ernmental institutions as regards trying to ensure proportionality
and rights-protection in counter-terrorist measures has emerged in
domestic jurisdictions such as the U.S. and the UK whereby, over a
number of cases, measures have slowly been made more rights-com-
pliant and taking human rights concerns seriously has been built in
ECR 11-0000 and will be revisited in the appeals in C-403/06 P Ayadi and Case C-399/
06 P Hassan.
225. Meeting of the SC, 15 December 2008, UN Doc S/PV.6043.
226. Id.
227. See the most recent report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitor-
ing Team established pursuant to SC Resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by
Resolution 1822 (2008), May 11, 2009, available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/
1267/monitoringteam.shtml, which describes Kadi as "arguably the most significant
legal development to affect the [Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions] regime since its in-
ception" (at 10).
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to the processes of both making and applying law.228 Although the
ECJ, the SC and the Sanctions Committee do not have the same kind
of relationship as, for example, a domestic Supreme Court, Executive,
Parliament and law enforcement agency (nor do we mean here to sug-
gest that they do), the nature of the inter-institutional and inter-
organizational dialogue may progress along analogous lines. The po-
tential of such dialogue, and the importance of independent judicial
review in this regard, was expressly recognized post-Kadi by the SC's
Monitoring Team for the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime. 229
Yet, this was done with a warning note-a further element in the
dialogue-that the Sanctions Committee may only value the view of a
national or regional court that has carefully evaluated reasons for
listing as stated by the Committee and has accorded appropriate def-
erence to its fact-finding and decision-making prerogatives. 230
The Monitoring Team's May 2009 Report provides further indica-
tion that, as we have suggested above, the question of the extent to
which courts are entitled to examine the-often classified-evidence
behind listing decisions may form the next litigation battleground in
this area.231 The reaction of the CFI-and ultimately, potentially, the
ECJ-to the follow-up challenge from Mr. Kadi may well provide the
key to understanding the extent to which Kadi truly represents the
ECJ's willingness to engage in such dialogue or, in the alternative,
whether Kadi really ought to be seen as a dualist, sovereigntist, and
isolationist judgment for which the local legal system was the sole
intended theatre.
228. This jurisprudence is documented by de Londras in Fiona de Londras & Fer-
gal F. Davis, Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives
on Effective Oversight Mechanisms (2010) OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
(forthcoming).
229. Report of the SC's Analytical Support and Monitoring Team for the Al-Qaeda
and Taliban sanctions regime, May 2009, supra note 227, para. 28,
If national and regional courts provide a forum for listed persons to bring
additional information to the fore and to express their grievances, they may
allow a better evaluation of the strengths or weaknesses of the cases against
them, especially when the challenge is brought in the courts of the designat-
ing States, which will likely have the most information against them.
On the potential ofjudicial-rather than diplomatic-review to apply pressure to im-
prove listing procedures, see Monika Heupel, Multilateral Sanctions Against Terror
Suspects and Due Process Standards, 85(2) INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 307 (2009).
230. Id., para. 29.
231. Id., para. 22:
[11f the Court decides to examine the evidence behind the reasons for
listing provided by the Committee, or if it decides it must conduct a complete
review of the listing decisions, it will give rise to new and more difficult is-
sues. The narrative summaries indicate the existence of evidence known to
Committee members, not all of which is publicly available. There are limits
to the ability of the Committee to reveal the reasons behind its decisions,
even to a reviewing body, when these are based on intelligence or law en-
forcement information which belongs to a particular State.
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While this article was in print, the UK Supreme Court handed
down its decision in HM Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmend and
Ors (FC); HM Treasury v. Mohammed al-Ghabra (FC); R (on the ap-
plication of Hani El Sayed Sabei Youssef) v. HM Treasury [2010]
UKSC 2. The Court quashed in part the Al Qaida Order and the Ter-
rorism Order. In quashing the Al Qaida Order, the Supreme Court
avoided the question of Article 103 of the UN Charter and focused
instead on domestic law considerations.
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